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Fairness, Copyright, and Video Games:
Hate the Game, Not the Player
Shani Shisha*
Creative communities often rely on social norms to regulate the
production of creative content. Yet while an emerging body of literature has focused on isolated accounts of social norms operating in
discrete, small-scale creative industries, no research to date has explored the social norms that pervade the world’s largest content microcosm—the sprawling video game community.
Now a veritable global phenomenon, the video game industry
has recently grown to eclipse the music and motion picture industries. But despite its meteoric rise, the video game industry has provoked little attention from copyright scholars. This Article is the first
to explore the shifting role of copyright law in the gaming community, where game developers are increasingly using a complex amalgam of legal and nonlegal tools to regulate creative output. Based
on an in-depth analysis of the extralegal norms that govern creative
content in the video game industry, this Article distills a richly detailed account of the relationship between video game creators and
consumers. It maps the intricate web of interests underpinning the
relationship between game developers and consumers; identifies a
rich cadre of fairness-driven social norms that permeate the gaming
community; and considers the implications of these findings for
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copyright law. The Article ultimately concludes that strong copyright protection is largely (though not entirely) inessential in areas
where norms of fairness drive the production of creative content.
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has ushered in a tectonic shift in the world of
mass entertainment. From music aggregators to on-demand video
streaming, content providers have been wrestling over the attention
of consumers across a wide range of content services. But the intensifying competition in the entertainment market has done little to
temper the growth of the video game industry. Now a veritable
global phenomenon, the video game market has recently grown to
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eclipse the music and motion picture industries.1 In fact, video
games now make up the largest entertainment market in the world
by an order of magnitude.2 The most popular video game in the
world, Fortnite by Epic Games, generated roughly three billion dollars in 2018 alone, far surpassing the highest-grossing movie of all
time.3 This is hardly surprising given the fact that Fortnite boasts
some 250 million active players.4 These staggering figures paint a
stark picture of an ever-changing world. As traditional forms of

1

The film industry’s revenues in 2018 totaled $43 billion. See David Robb, U.S. Film
Industry Topped $43 Billion In Revenue Last Year, Study Finds, But It’s Not All
Good News, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (July 13, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/07/filmindustry-revenue-2017-ibisworld-report-gloomy-box-office-1202425692/ [https://perma.
cc/5R7G-QDLV]; Asit Sharma, The State of the Movie Industry in 2018, THE MOTLEY
FOOL (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/09/19/the-state-of-themovie-industry-in-2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/HRL5-3P5T]. The music industry
generated $9.8 billion in 2018. See RIAA 2018 YEAR-END MUSIC INDUSTRY REVENUE
REPORT (2019), [https://perma.cc/7TNS-QAG9]. The video game industry has
outperformed both industries, grossing more than $130 billion in 2018. See James
Batchelor, Global Games Market Value Rising to $134.9bn in 2018, GAMES INDUSTRY
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2018-12-18-global-gamesmarket-value-rose-to-usd134-9bn-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/48J6-FAAM] (noting that the
video game industry has generated almost $135 billion in revenues); Kellie Ell, Video
Game Industry is Booming with Continued Revenue, CNBC ONLINE (July 18, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/video-game-industry-is-booming-with-continuedrevenue.html [https://perma.cc/JX8S-EWVB] (reporting that the video game industry is
projected to gross nearly $138 billion by the end of the year).
2
Sheena Jordan, The Gaming Industry is Now Bigger than Hollywood, ECONOTIMES
(July 19, 2019), https://www.econotimes.com/The-Gaming-Industry-Is-Now-BiggerThan-Hollywood-1558784 [https://perma.cc/YW2F-ELY3].
3
See, e.g., Jon Russell, Epic Games, the Creator of Fortnite, Banked a $3 Billion Profit
in 2018, TECH CRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/27/epic-fortnite3-billion-profit/ [https://perma.cc/QL9Z-EWW5]. Fortnite reportedly generates millions
of dollars a day. Aisha Hassan, Fortnite’s Creator Made $7 Billion This Year, QUARTZ
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://qz.com/1512561/fortnite-developer-tim-sweeney-made-7-billionthis-year/ [https://perma.cc/74HL-YFY4]. Strikingly, Fortnite made almost $300 million
in the month of April 2018 alone. Nick Statt, Fortnite Made Nearly $300 Million in the
Month of April, THE VERGE (May 24, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/24/173
90004/fortnite-battle-royale-money-made-revenue-300-million-april-2018 [https://perma
.cc/NA6E-64PT]. The highest-grossing movie of all time is Avengers: Endgame, which
raked in $2.79 billion to date. Josh Jackson, The 20 Highest-Grossing Movies of All Time,
PASTE MAGAZINE (Sept. 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Y2FT-ZLVP].
4
Ben Gilbert, How Big is ‘Fortnite’? With Nearly 250 Million Players, It’s over TwoThirds the Size of the U.S. Population, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.business
insider.com/how-many-people-play-fortnite-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/WF48-MR55].
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mass entertainment remain stagnant,5 video games continue to
thrive. In the U.K., for example, video games account for more than
half of the entire entertainment market.6 And although video games
largely cater to a younger audience, they are growing increasingly
popular among older consumers.7
Video games are also rapidly gaining traction as vehicles of cultural currency. Games like Fortnite have become a mainstay of popular culture, with thousands of YouTube videos mimicking the animated dance moves featured in the game.8 A recent study also suggests that some players think of Fortnite as their primary social media platform.9 Moreover, a recent poll found that a whopping 75%
of Americans have at least one video game player in their household.10 Video games have likewise crept into other fora of mass

5

See Press Release, IFPI Global Music Report, State of the Industry (2018),
https://www.ifpi.org/ifpi-global-music-report-2018/
[https://perma.cc/H8MB-KZLE]
(noting that despite three consecutive years of growth in the music industry, “revenues for
2017 are still only 68.4% of the market’s peak in 1999”).
6
VB Staff, With Record-Breaking Revenue, the U.K. Game Industry is Blowing Up,
VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:10 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/18/withrecord-breaking-revenue-the-u-k-game-industry-is-blowing-up/ [https://perma.cc/4LLK3N5D] (calling attention to the fact that “[i]n 2018, games accounted for more than half of
the entire U.K. entertainment market, 51.3 percent, outselling music and video combined,
for the first time”).
7
See, e.g., Erin Lee, The Cultural Impact of Video Games, ODYSSEY (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://www.theodysseyonline.com/cultural-impact-video-games [https://perma.cc/2SPW
-6K8T] (observing that 44% of the people who play video games are aged 36 or older);
Keith Stuart, Game Changers: How the Increasing Cultural Significance of Video Games
is Reflected in Our Coverage, THE GUARDIAN (July 21, 2017), [https://perma.cc/SD7FYJ8A] (“Most modern surveys show the audience for games has an almost even gender
split, and the average age of a player is around 35.”).
8
See David Lumb, ‘Fortnite’ Wants to Put Your Dance in the Game, ENGADGET (Mar.
30, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-03-30-fortnite-boogiedown-put-your-dancein-game.html [https://perma.cc/S997-8LUS] (pointing out that professional athletes “won’t
stop mimicking the game’s weird dances in real life”); Delaney Strunk, Watching These
Professional Dancers Try The “Fortnite Dance Challenge” Will Actually Make Your Day,
BUZZFEED (June 27, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/delaneystrunk/fortnite-dancechallenge [https://perma.cc/4U2B-FQ72] (discussing the “new viral internet video
challenge” known as the “Fortnite dance challenge”).
9
NATIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, FORTNITE: THE NEW SOCIAL MEDIA? (2020),
[https://perma.cc/3YEB-3UFD].
10
ENT. SOFTWARE ASS’N, ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY (2020),
https://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Final-Edited-2020-ESA_Essential_
facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN8W-6Y6W].
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media, and a growing cascade of movies and television shows are
now premised on (or inspired by) video games11—a clear indication
of the cultural force that drives the video game market.
The explosive growth of the video game industry has drawn increased scrutiny from third parties. A spate of recent lawsuits take
aim at game developers for allegedly failing to support individual
creators. Most notably, game developers have recently faced legal
challenges involving claims of copyright infringement with respect
to protected choreographies.12 Other controversies concern the likeness of professional athletes in sports video games.13 And a number
11

See JACK LULE, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA AND CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MASS
COMMUNICATION 418 (2010) (suggesting that, unlike movies of the 1980s, modern-day
movies are often derivative of preexisting video games).
12
One such lawsuit was brought by Alfonso Ribeiro, former star of the show The Fresh
Prince of Bel-Air. Ribeiro alleged that Fortnite’s creators misappropriated his famous
dance routine from the show. Amir Vera & Chris Boyette, ‘Fresh Prince’ Star Alfonso
Ribeiro Sues Fortnite Over Use of Dance His Character Carlton Popularized, CNN (Dec.
18, 2018, 11:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/18/entertainment/carlton-suesfortnite-video-game/index.html [https://perma.cc/9U26-FCZ2]. Ribeiro subsequently
withdrew his lawsuit following the Copyright Office’s refusal to register his copyright on
the grounds that his dance moves were not elaborate enough to qualify as a choreography.
Joe Price, Alfonso Ribeiro Drops Carlton Dance ‘Fortnite’ Lawsuit Against Epic Games,
COMPLEX (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2019/03/alfonso-ribeirodrops-fortnite-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/Y876-9SKH]. Another lawsuit was brought by
rapper Terrence Ferguson, known by his stage-name “2 Milly,” charging that Fortnite’s
developers had used his “Milly Rock” dance in the game. Stefanie Fogel, Rapper 2 Milly
Is Suing Epic Games over ‘Fortnite’ Dance Emote, VARIETY (Dec. 5, 2018, 7:33 PM),
https://variety.com/2018/gaming/news/2-milly-epic-games-fortnite-lawsuit-1203080818/
[https://perma.cc/SM8J-VP67]. A third lawsuit was brought by the parents of Russell
Redd, known as the “Backpack Kid,” who claims to have conjured up the dance move
colloquially known as “The Floss.” See, e.g., Austen Goslin, Backpack Kid is Also Suing
Epic Games over a Dance in Fortnite, POLYGON (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.polygon.com/fortnite/2018/12/18/18146770/backpack-kid-dance-fortniteepic-games-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/V5NB-SGSX].
13
Jason M. Bailey, Athletes Don’t Own Their Tattoos. That’s a Problem for Video Game
Developers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/
style/tattoos-video-games.html [https://perma.cc/935L-ZQGW]. As a general matter,
people do not own the tattoos inked on their bodies; rather, tattoos are typically owned by
the artists who created them. It thus remains unclear whether professional athletes, for
example, can commercialize or license their likeness without obtaining permission from
the tattoo artists who inked their bodies. Indeed, tattoo artists brought a number of recent
lawsuits against video game developers for digitally recreating the likeness of professional
athletes, including the tattoos displayed on their bodies. Id. And although the conventional
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of high-profile trademark cases grapple with the use of marks in
video games—consider cases like E.S.S. Entertainment v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc., in which the owners of the Play Pen mark alleged that
the defendant’s depiction of the “Pig Pen” strip club in the video
game Grand Theft Auto infringed their rights.14
These cases implicate a limited assortment of intellectual property (“IP”) questions. But the intersection of copyright law and
video games has thus far eluded scholarly attention. Copyright
scholars have been loath to address many of the core questions that
spring from the growth of video games.15 This omission is particularly glaring in light of the emerging body of work devoted to exploring the relationship between IP and social norms. In recent
years, IP scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the role
of social norms in incentivizing innovation. The literature is awash
in scholarly accounts of social norms operating in tandem with, or
in opposition to, positive copyright law.16 Some norms inform

wisdom is that people are implicitly authorized to display their tattoos in public, including
in television interviews, it is debatable whether this implicit license extends to digitally
recreated avatars in video games. Id.
14
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
15
Scholarly accounts of the relationship between copyright law and video games are
few and far between. These accounts mostly focus on questions of infringement and
substantial similarity. See, e.g., Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law
to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (1982); William K. Ford, Copy Game for High
Score: The First Video Game Lawsuit, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2012); John Kuehl, Video
Games and Intellectual Property: Similarities, Differences, and a New Approach to
Protection, 7 CYBARIS 314 (2016); Steven B. McKnight, Substantial Similarity Between
Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277
(1983).
16
See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should
Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121
(2007); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property
Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed.,
2008); Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer,
in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 97 (2005); Jacqueline D. Lipton, To © or Not to ©? Copyright and Innovation
in the Digital Typeface Industry, 43 U.S. DAVIS L. REV. 143 (2009); Fiona Murray et al.,
Of Mice and Academic: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation, 8 AM. ECON. J.
ECON. POLICY 212 (2008); Charles Cronin, Genius in a Bottle: Perfume, Copyright, and
Human Perception, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 427 (2009).
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judicial interpretation of the law.17 Others seek to dislodge the law
altogether by introducing a competing, extralegal regime.18 And
countless norms take on a complementary role, operating within the
confines of the negative space of copyright law,19 i.e., in domains
left partly or wholly ungoverned by the law.20 These norms permeate creative industries that thrive despite, or perhaps because of, the
lack of formal IP protection. Yet despite the flurry of recent work
on norms-based governance of IP, no research to date has examined
the social norms that pervade the video game industry.
This Article is the first serious effort to analyze the social norms
that govern creative content in the video game community. It maps
the complex web of interests underlying the relationship between
consumers and video game developers. It then draws out a number
of social norms rooted in notions of fairness. In the context of video
games, I understand fairness as a repository of three interrelated
concepts: (1) competitive integrity, (2) wealth sharing, and (3) labor.
First, I identify norms of competitive integrity.21 I show that
a game’s commercial success largely turns on whether it appears
to be competitively fair. Games are thought to be unfair when
players are allowed to pay money—say, through in-game
17

See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1918–19 (2007). See also infra notes 162–173.
18
Consider, for example, the social norms prevalent among web bloggers, who
frequently republish (without obtaining consent) entire articles lifted from newspapers.
Mark F. Schultz, Copynorms: Copyright and Social Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 201, 225–26
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). These norms fly in the face of copyright law; although wholesale
copying likely amounts to copyright infringement, bloggers and newspapers seem to accept
that unlicensed copying in this context is (at least partially) tolerable.
19
The term “negative space” was coined by Chris Sprigman and Kal Raustiala. See, e.g.,
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1201, 1201–02 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox]; Elizabeth
L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 (2011).
20
While copyright law does not effectively extend to jokes and recipes, comedians and
top-end French chefs have fashioned a complex, extralegal system of community norms to
regulate the unsanctioned use of these works. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman,
There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and
the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008); Emmanuelle
Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of
French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008).
21
See infra Section III.A.
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microtransactions—to obtain a competitive in-game advantage.
At bottom, modern video games are social enterprises: they are
founded on the social experience that results from interactions
between players. More importantly, modern games allow players to
compete with and against each other. But in-game competition can
only meaningfully arise if everyone stands an equal chance of
competing. The success of a video game thus hinges on players’
perception of fairness: they must believe that the game affords everyone an opportunity to compete on equal terms. This egalitarian
ideal is defied when games permit players to buy competitive
enhancements. Players often describe such games in terms of a
“pay-to-win” scheme, where one’s odds of winning depend upon her
ability or willingness to pay.22 As a result, players largely eschew
video games that offer competitive (rather than cosmetic) enhancements through in-game microtransactions.
This account complements the conventional behavioral analysis
of microtransactions. Behavioral economists point to systemic consumer misperceptions to explain the proliferation of in-game purchases. They suggest, broadly speaking, that consumers are myopic
and over-optimistic, and are thus unlikely to appreciate the costs associated with microtransactions. I contend that systemic misperceptions cannot fully account for the success (and occasional failure) of
micropayments. Instead, I argue that a nuanced approach—marrying behavioral economics and norms of fairness—can paint a more
complete portrait of why and when microtransactions flourish.
The Article then excavates a second layer of nonlegal norms in
the gaming community: norms grounded in perceptions of wealth
sharing.23 I suggest that gamers are positively inclined to support a
game when they believe that a substantial portion of the game is
offered for free. Fortnite, for example, is a free-to-play game; although the basic version of the game itself is free, players can make
in-game purchases of premium digital products.24 This business
model proved successful in no small part because the game’s

22

See infra text accompanying notes 186–223.
See infra Section III.B.
24
Elizabeth Matsangou, How Fortnite Became the Most Successful Free-to-Play Game
Ever, THE NEW ECONOMY (Nov. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/HN49-T858].
23
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developers appear to be sharing the wealth. They do so by offering
the basic version of the game, stripped of many of its cosmetic elements, for free. I show that perceptions of wealth sharing can cultivate a reciprocal community of loyal players, thus increasing the
likelihood of commercial success.
Third, I argue that notions of fairness are particularly ubiquitous
in online communities clustered around live gameplay streams on
the website Twitch, the world’s largest hub for gaming streams.25
Gamers guard forcefully against perceived misappropriations of
their gameplay streams, although it is unclear whether gamers hold
any rights to such streams. Still, members of the gaming community
view such streams as instantiations of hard labor, expertise and (to
some extent) artistry. And they consider any misappropriation to be
an incident of illegitimate norm violation. I evaluate this anti-appropriation norm, demarcate its contours, and review the enforcement
mechanisms that sustain it.26
This study brings into focus three disparate norms of fairness.
The first two—competitive integrity and wealth sharing—can be
traced to the underlying business relationship between video game
creators and consumers. These norms inform the prevailing free-toplay pricing model employed by game developers. By contrast, the
third set of norms—namely, norms grounded in labor—stem from
interactions amongst fellow players. These norms do not directly
implicate game developers, but rather govern the ways in which
players engage with each other to protect the fruits of their labor,
i.e., their gameplay streams. The Article contextualizes these ideas
of fairness against the broader landscape of IP theory. And it considers the literature on extralegal norms of fairness to explain how
these norms might prove useful in thinking through some of the
problems that have long marred copyright law.
This extralegal realm carries implications for our understanding
of the interplay between copyright law and ideas of fairness. The

25

See Imad Khan, Why Twitch Is Still the King of Live Game Streaming, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/business/tech-video-gamestreaming-twitch.html [https://perma.cc/DCR5-T3H9]. See generally T.L. TAYLOR,
WATCH ME PLAY: TWITCH AND THE RISE OF GAME LIVE STREAMING (2018).
26
See infra Section III.C.
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Article makes three principal contributions to the literature. First, it
develops a rich account of fairness norms in the gaming community.
In doing so, it brings to the fore a unique extralegal domain that lurks
in the shadows of the world’s largest content industry. While an
emerging body of literature has so far focused on isolated incidents
of social norms operating in discrete, small-scale creative communities, this Article provides meaningful insights into the workings of
the largest copyright microcosm in the world—the sprawling gaming community.
Second, this Article lends credence to the oft-invoked claim that
copyright law is overbroad. I argue that norms of fairness can mitigate the risks associated with content creation so long as consumers
regard as “fair” the content producer’s business model. Norms of
fairness therefore counsel against strong IP protection: they minimize the need for strong legal interventions in areas where fairness—rather than the law—drives creativity. To be clear, I am not
suggesting that copyright law is entirely redundant. Some measure
of legal protection remains necessary to prevent wholesale copying
by market competitors. Instead, this Article argues that, to better
confront the realities of a fairness-driven world, we should pare back
copyright’s scope and reach.
Third, the norms associated with live gaming streams call into
question the veracity of the labor theory. According to John Locke’s
theory of labor, creators are entitled to natural rights in their works
because they had labored to create these works. But norms of fairness in the gaming community illustrate the difficulty of pinpointing
what labor actually means in community-specific contexts. This Article ultimately concludes that, despite its salience in some quarters
of the globe, the labor theory is ill-suited to shape or otherwise inform copyright law.
Finally, I should say a few words about the limits of this enterprise. The broader scholarship on video games has identified a rich
panoply of social norms that suffuse the gaming world—from
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“subcultures of geeks,”27 to norms of video game modifications,28
to norms of in-game creativity,29 to the political norms that proliferate among gamers.30 My inquiry expands upon this scholarship by
shedding light on a unique species of norms—that is, norms linked
to the regulation of business and content from an IP perspective. Far
from offering an exhaustive account, this Article aims to jumpstart
a conversation about the relationship between IP and video games
more broadly.
I should also clarify that my use of the term “fairness” here is
descriptive rather than philosophical. The concept of fairness is itself contested and starkly indeterminate.31 My goal in this Article,
therefore, is to chalk out an account of gamers’ subjective perceptions of fairness. I do not claim that these perceptions actually embody ideals of fairness. Nor am I adjudging these perceptions to be
normatively desirable. My ambition is to develop a nuanced picture
of these perceived notions of fairness in order to work out their
broader implications for intellectual property. The norms detailed
below—competitive integrity, wealth sharing, and labor—betray
wildly divergent ideas of fairness. And so I do not advance a unified,
27

LULE, supra note 11, at 418 (describing subcultures of “geeks” who find refuge in the
“imaginary worlds” of videos games).
28
William W. Fisher, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1417, 1421–22 (2010) (observing that “purchasers of computer games routinely modify
them”); Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 585
(2016) (discussing modifications to Nintendo video games); see also Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the use of add-on
software to modify the gameplay of Nintendo games does not infringe Nintendo’s rights).
29
Much of the writing in this vein has focused on the video game Minecraft, where
players engage with a digital world in which they use various 3D objects to shape their
environment. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING MINECRAFT: ESSAYS ON PLAY, COMMUNITY AND
POSSIBILITIES (Nate Garrelts ed., 2014); Maria Cipollone, Catherine C. Schifter, & Rick A.
Moffat, Minecraft as a Creative Tool: A Case Study, 1 INT’L. J. GAME-BASED LEARNING 1
(2014); Greg Lastowka, Minecraft as Web 2.0: Amateur Creativity and Digital Games, in
153 AMATEUR MEDIA: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Dan Hunter et al.
eds., 2012).
30
See Lawrence Lessig on What MMOs Can Teach Us About Real Life Politics, SEED
PROJECT, https://www.seed-project.io/post/lawrence-lessig-on-what-mmos-can-teach-usabout-real-life-politics [https://perma.cc/SVF8-53AS].
31
See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright,
97 B.U. L. REV. 1487, 1508–10 (2017) (discussing the concept of fairness as both a
philosophical and subjective term, while noting the complexity that surrounds its
application and theoretical elaboration).
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overarching theory of fairness. I focus instead on describing with
clarity the perceived ideas of fairness to which gamers subscribe. At
the same time, I recognize that these ideas may fail to meet the
threshold for a fully synthesized philosophical account of fairness.
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces some of
the themes central to the resurgence of the video game industry, focusing on the industry’s shift to a service-based, online business
model. This review is necessarily cursory, but it provides important
background for the broader argument. Part II then provides an overview of the literature on nonlegal copyright norms. Through the confluence of business strategy and copyright norms, Part III next explores extralegal gaming norms that circle around notions of fairness. Part IV considers the implications of this analysis for copyright
law writ large. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

MODERN-DAY VIDEO GAMES

This Part maps recent developments in the video game industry,
focusing on the evolution of video games in the digital age. Specifically, it suggests that the video game industry now relies on a service-based business model—one that is geared toward cultivating
long-lasting, online communities of loyal players.
A. Digital Video Games
The video game industry dates back to the 1970s, with the release of Pong by Atari in 1972.32 Rapidly morphing into a multibillion-dollar industry, the world of video games has undergone two
dramatic shifts in recent years. The first involves the transition to
digital, online-driven games. The second concerns the shift from
one-off transactions to a pricing model based on an ongoing service.
And these shifts, in turn, have combined to produce two related
32

See Henmes, supra note 15, at 171 (noting that “the earliest games appeared in the
1970s”); Ford, supra note 15, at 1 (arguing that the video game industry first took shape in
1972); Christian Genetski & Christian Troncoso, Copyright Industry Perspectives: The
Pivotal Role of TPMS in the Evolution of the Video Game Industry, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
359, 359 (2015) (“Although there is considerable debate about the industry’s precise
birthdate, most point to the early- to mid-1970s as the point at which video games entered
into the mainstream consciousness.”).
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phenomena: the growth of gameplay streaming and the advent of
competitive gaming. I will take up these issues in turn.
The first shift, from physical to digital, is emblematic of the
world of content more broadly.33 The music and television industries, for example, have both shifted to consumption models that are
insulated from physical albums (in the music industry) and physical
devices (in the television industry).34 And the video game industry,
too, has pivoted to a business model that is largely grounded in digital consumption.35 While brick-and-mortar stores still offer physical copies of video games, these games increasingly offer a wide
range of features that are uniquely accessible online.36
Think, for example, of popular video games such as Mortal
Kombat, Tekken, and Street Fighter.37 In the 1990s, these games
were all exclusively playable on coin-operated arcade cabinets.38
33

Ido Kilovaty, Freedom to Hack, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 457 (2019) (discussing the
technological shift from hardware to software and recognizing that “[p]hysical objects are
being supplemented, and even replaced, by software”).
34
Major changes in the way people consume television content have been attributed to
the rise of Netflix. See Alex Haslam, How Streaming Services Are Changing the Television
Industry, BESTTECHIE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.besttechie.com/how-streamingservices-are-changing-the-television-industry/ [https://perma.cc/JX86-8J6V]; Lanre
Bakare, Netflix Has Forever Changed the Way We Consume Television, THE GUARDIAN
(July 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6SXN-Q5FA]. In the music industry, streaming
accounted for roughly 75% of industry revenues in 2018. See Madison Bloom, Streaming
Made Up 75% of Music Industry Revenue in 2018, PITCHFORK (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/RIAA-2018-Year-End-Music-Industr
y -Revenue-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PJJ-KX2P].
35
Riordan Zentler, Digital vs. Physical: How the Video Game Industry Learned from
Microsoft’s Missteps, THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW (Apr. 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/2ZQ3KGSC] (“For more than a decade, video games have been steadily shifting away from
physical sales toward digital distribution, much the same as music and film.”); see also text
accompanying infra notes 43–45.
36
Zentler, supra note 35.
37
These are the most popular fighting games in the world. See Brian Altano & Ryan
Clements, Street Fighter vs. Tekken vs. Mortal Kombat, IGN (Sept. 24, 2012),
https://www.ign.com/articles/2012/09/24/street-fighter-vs-tekken-vs-mortal-kombat-bythe-numbers [https://perma.cc/6QWC-KPZE].
38
See Chin Osathanunkul, A Classification of Business Models in Video Game Industry,
17 INT’L J. MGMT. CASES 35, 40 (2015). Arcade machines typically require players to pay
a small amount, often as little as a dime, for a single play. David Murphy, Hacking Public
Memory: Understanding the Multiple Arcade Machine Emulator, 8 GAMING & CULTURE
43, 45 (2013). Charles Bernstein further reasons that arcade games are grounded in the
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But even these games—that is, traditional offline games—have
gravitated toward an online model where many of the games’ unique
features are only accessible online. For example, consumers must be
able to access online servers if they wish to get their hands on new
cosmetic designs for existing characters in the game Tekken.39 Put
another way, even games that one might purchase at a physical retail
store are still very much “online”—though anchored in a physical
copy, they are nevertheless bound up with digital servers.
The shift toward digital games is perhaps best evidenced by the
explosion of digital sales. Music has become increasingly digital,40
as has the television industry.41 The same is true of the publishing
industry, where Amazon Kindle books have radically transformed
the publishing marketplace.42 But the pervasiveness of digital goods
is most pronounced in the video game market; 80% of video game
sales in the U.K., for example, stem from digital transactions.43 And
in the U.S. market, the share of digital sales has increased from 20%
in 2009 to an astounding 83% in 2018.44 Analysts similarly predict
that by 2022 video games “will be 100% digital.”45 The picture is
economy of time, where better players get to play longer games. Arcade games were thus
designed to get players “to part, and keep parting, with their quarters.” Charles Bernstein,
Play It Again, Pac-Man, in THE MEDIUM OF THE VIDEO GAME 155, 157 (Mark J. Wolf &
Bernard Perron eds., 1991).
39
See, e.g., Downloadable Content for Tekken 7, STEAM, https://store.steam
powered.com/dlc/389730/TEKKEN_7/ [https://perma.cc/WL88-TRZ6] (listing different
content packages that can be downloaded for the game Tekken 7).
40
See Bloom, supra note 34.
41
Id.
42
Andrei Maxim & Alexandru Maxim, The Role of E-Books in Reshaping the
Publishing Industry, 62 PROCEDIA–SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 1046 (2012); PWC, TURNING THE
PAGE: THE FUTURE OF EBOOKS (2010); David Pierce, The Kindle Changed the Book
Business. Can It Change Books?, WIRED (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/
can-amazon-change-books/ [https://perma.cc/9PPW-FJRQ].
43
Wesley Yin-Poole, UK Video Game Sales Now 80% Digital, EUROGAMER (Jan. 3,
2019), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2019-01-03-uk-video-game-sales-now-80-perc
ent-digital [https://perma.cc/742G-R9SU].
44
STATISTA RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, BREAKDOWN OF U.S. COMPUTER AND VIDEO
GAME SALES FROM 2009 TO 2017, BY DELIVERY FORMAT (2019).
45
Robin Burks, Video Games Will Be 100% Digital by 2022 Says Analysts, GAME NEWS
(June 26, 2018), https://screenrant.com/video-games-digital-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/
G2UW-QFVJ]. Another report estimates that digital sales will account for 93% of the
market by 2021. Chad Sapieha, Digital Sales to Account for Nearly 93% of All Video Game
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clear: digital games have toppled physical-form games to claim dominion over the video game market.
B. Video Games as a Service
The growing popularity of digital games has inspired a related
shift from a lump-sum pricing model to a service-based pricing
scheme. Broadly speaking, game publishers rely on three pricing
models: (1) a lump sum (flat fee) model; (2) a subscription scheme;
and (3) a free-to-play model.46
A lump sum model involves one-off transactions where the consumer purchases a copy of the game, either digital or physical, in
exchange for a single, fixed payment.47 By contrast, under a subscription model, consumers make monthly payments in exchange
for ongoing access to the game. Subscription models are most prevalent in the context of multiplayer online games.48 These are games
in which multiple players engage with each other in a massive online
world. To access these games, players must pay a monthly subscription fee.49 And, unlike erstwhile games of the 1980s, multiplayer
online games are meant to be played for years, not days or weeks.50
Players establish “clans” or “guilds,” build communities, and foster
long-lasting relationships.51 The online world that animates these
games is rich. It consistently evolves through “expansion packages”:
Sales by 2021: Report, FIN. POST (June 29, 2017), https://financialpost.com/
technology/gaming/digital-sales-to-account-for-nearly-93-of-all-game-sales-by-2021-rep
ort [https://perma.cc/J6M7-KYE4]. See also Robert Workman, Digital Game Sales Reach
All Time High During Black Friday Weekend, COMICBOOK (Dec. 2, 2018), https://comic
book.com/gaming/news/digital-game-sales-all-time-high-cyber-monday-black-friday/
[https://perma.cc/X4GU-888T]; Jessica Conditt, Console Gaming is at a Crossroads,
ENGADGET (Apr. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/7XZD-DL5Y] (observing that 2013 was “the
first year that digital video game sales overtook physical, claiming 54 percent of the
market”).
46
Kuehl, supra note 15, at 324–28.
47
Id. at 324–25.
48
Id. at 325.
49
Id.
50
Stuart, supra note 7 (observing that “[t]he last five years have also seen the emergence
of games designed to be played, not just for a few days, but for years”).
51
Helena Cole & Mark D. Griffiths, Social Interactions in Massively Multiplayer
Online Role-Playing Gamers, 10 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 575, 575 (2007)
(finding that multiplayer games provide opportunities to form strong relationships, with
“high percentages of gamers making life-long friends…”).
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periodic updates that inject additional content (such as plotlines or
characters) into the game’s preexisting digital world, thus generating a constant stream of new content to keep consumers engaged
over time.52
This subscription model mirrors the broader move toward service-oriented transactions. Indeed, digital contents are increasingly
licensed to consumers in the guise of a service—an ongoing, longterm commercial relationship where consumers pay a monthly fee
in exchange for a license to access information goods. Similar trends
have emerged in the music industry, for example, where consumers
pay monthly fees to access enormous content libraries offered by
aggregators such as Apple Music or Spotify.53
Nonetheless, the service-oriented revolution of the digital era
runs counter to the romantic vision of copyright law, which contemplates a standalone artist selling her work through one-off transactions.54 The shift toward service-like transactions is troublesome
from a consumer perspective. For one thing, consumers must rely
on the content provider for continued access to the licensed content.
Consumers might lose access to such content if, say, the content provider changes its business model, goes out of business, revokes the
consumers’ subscription, or is otherwise forced to remove certain
contents from its library.55 Indeed, in a number of recent high-profile

52

OSCAR CLARK, GAMES AS A SERVICE: HOW FREE TO PLAY DESIGN CAN MAKE BETTER
GAMES 7 (2014) (pointing out that free-to-play games require “a commitment long after
the release of the game to sustain it with new content, events, and features.”).
53
Apple Music, for example, commands a catalogue of some 70 million songs—with a
monthly subscription fee ranging from $5 to $15. See Apple Music, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/apple-music/ [https://perma.cc/N9PB-CN2R].
54
See Martin Kretschmer, Digital Copyright: The End of an Era, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 333 (2003); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L. J. 455 (1991); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the
Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author”, 17
EIGHTEEN CENTURY STUDIES 425 (1984).
55
Consider, for example, Amazon’s decision to remotely delete purchased copies of
George Orwell’s book NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR following a dispute with the publisher of
Orwell’s books. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18am
azon.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QZZ3-5HLN]; see generally AARON PERZANOWSKI &
JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
(2016).
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instances, video game developers have banned players for allegedly
violating the terms of service.56
Service providers can similarly limit the ability of consumers to
make full use of licensed contents. Although many consumers wish
to download copies of the contents they consume,57 service providers routinely cap the number of copies, if any, that consumers may
retain.58 And consumers are also restricted in their capacity to access
content on third-party platforms. For example, while Apple allows
consumers to download copies of Apple Music songs, these copies
can only be accessed on Apple-approved platforms.59
To be sure, consumers often fail to discern the difference between ownership and licensing.60 An oft-neglected reality of the digital age is that consumers rarely acquire title to the digital contents
56

See Mallory Busch, World of Warcraft Bans ‘A Large Number’ of Players, TIME (May
15, 2015), https://time.com/3860623/world-warcraft-ban/ [https://perma.cc/RT7L-7SKQ];
Robert N. Adams, World Of Warcraft Bans Issued for Players Who Exploited Leveling
Potions, GAMEREVOLUTION (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.gamerevolution.com/news/
514191-world-of-warcraft-bans-draught-of-ten-lands
[https://perma.cc/N89N-74RS];
Blog, All Reasons for Which You Can Get Banned from WoW, UNBANSTER (July 8, 2018),
https://unbanster.com/reasons-banned-from-wow/
[https://perma.cc/QPD6-RTY7]
(reporting that revocations of accounts in World of Warcraft usually “come in waves”);
Daniel Terdiman, ‘World of Warcraft’ Bans Raise Players’ Ire, CNET (Mar. 22, 2007),
https://www.cnet.com/news/world-of-warcraft-bans-raise-players-ire/ [https://perma.cc/
MG8E-QLDR]; Jon Fingas, Epic Banned over 1,200 ‘Fortnite’ World Cup Players for
Cheating, ENGADGET (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019-04-20-epic-bans1200-fortnite-world-cup-players.html [https://perma.cc/6KFB-VVUY].
57
Surveys show that consumers are particularly troubled by the prospect of being
prevented from making private copies of various digital goods. NICOLE DUFFT ET AL.,
INDICARE, DIGITAL VIDEO USAGE AND DRM, RESULTS FROM A EUROPEAN CONSUMER
SURVEY 26–28 (2006).
58
Netflix, for example, limits the number of copies that consumers may download.
Downloading TV Shows and Movies on Netflix—Help Center, NETFLIX,
https://help.netflix.com/en/node/54816 [https://perma.cc/J9VZ-PG8Y].
59
How to Play Apple Music on Windows Media Player, M4VGEAR,
[https://perma.cc/DL84-K3GA] (explaining that Apple Music songs are in M4P format
with Apple FairPlay DRM protection, which restricts one from playing Apple Music on
common media players, such as Windows Media Player, Plex, and VLC Media Player).
60
See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy when We
Buy Now, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (2017). Perzanowski and Hoofnagle suggest that
consumers are oblivious to the significance of the distinction between licensing and
ownership. This misconception is reinforced by sellers like Amazon that employ “Buy
Now” banners to mislead consumers into thinking they are purchasing digital goods,
despite the fact that they are merely obtaining a limited license to access these goods.
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they consume. Instead, they obtain a limited license to access such
contents. One example is Amazon’s Kindle service. Consumers are
largely unaware that by “purchasing” books via Kindle they are
merely obtaining a revocable license to access these books.61 A licensing regime of this sort confers on consumers only a limited array of rights, subject to various limitations. For instance, consumers
are often contractually prevented from reselling, lending or otherwise transferring contents they had licensed.62 And, of course, consumers also face the risk of losing access to such contents if, say,
the content provider revokes their license or is forced to remove certain contents from its library.63

61

Suw Charman-Anderson, Amazon Ebooks Are Borrowed, Not Bought, FORBES (Oct.
23, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/2012/10/23/amazonebooks-are-borrowed-not-bought/ [https://perma.cc/8JXT-C8LP]; Joel Johnson, You
Don’t Own Your Kindle Books, Amazon Reminds Customer, NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012),
https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/you-dont-own-your-kindle-books-amazon-remindscustomer-1C6626211 [https://perma.cc/SS9B-ALPK]; Michael Hiltzik, E-Book
Restrictions Leave ‘Buyers’ With Few Rights, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2012),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2012-dec-22-la-fi-hiltzik-20121223-story.html
[https://perma.cc/BU9X-5HD8].
62
Copyright law entitles consumers to resell copies of protected works without
permission from the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). This entitlement arises under the
longstanding first sale doctrine, grounded in the principle that the owner’s rights are
exhausted upon the first sale of a copy, thus allowing subsequent consumers to transfer
copies as they see fit. Nonetheless, the first sale doctrine does not apply to consumers of
the sort described above. Rights provided under Section 109 of the Copyright Act
specifically attach to “the owner of a particular copy.” Licensees are therefore excluded
from the reach of Section 109. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 901–07 (2011) (discussing the marginalization of
copyright exhaustion in the age of digital distribution). Consistent with principles of
copyright exhaustion, Section 117 of the Copyright Act similarly authorizes consumers
who own copies of software programs to make adaptations of that software. 17 U.S.C. §
117(a). In this context, too, licensees are barred from making adaptations according to the
language of Section 117 .
63
Another troubling case is that of Linn Nygaard, an IT consultant from Norway who
woke up one day to find that her entire Amazon Kindle library had been wiped clean. Citing
“abuse of [] policies,” Amazon informed Nygaard that her account had been revoked. An
avid Kindle consumer, Nygaard was understandably distraught; she received no prior
warning and was never given a reason for the revocation of her account. Her entire library,
encompassing dozens of books, inexplicably evaporated overnight. See, e.g., Michelle
Jaworski, Amazon Restores Kindle User’s Mysteriously-Deleted Account, Still No
Explanation, THE DAILY DOT (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.dailydot.com/news
/amazon-linn-nygaard-deleted-account-restored/ [https://perma.cc/65GA-AQKM].
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This discussion homes in on two pricing models: lump-sum and
subscription models. And yet these models have been gradually displaced by a third pricing scheme: free-to-play games. A case in point
is Blizzard’s World of Warcraft (WoW).64 At its zenith, WoW was
the most popular subscription-based video game in the world, with
a consumer base of ten million active players and 100 million registered accounts in 2009.65 By 2017, the game banked just shy of ten
billion dollars, making it the most successful video game franchise
of all time.66 In recent years, however, WoW’s popularity has been
dwindling. Analysts predict that the number of WoW subscribers
will fall to 4.5 million players by 2023.67 And WoW’s demise is
attributable to a larger trend: subscription models are largely ceding
ground to free-to-play games.
Free-to-play games, also known as “freemium” games,68 have
grown immensely popular in recent years. These games typically
span multiple ecosystems69 and can be downloaded and accessed
online.70 Freemium games are particularly abundant on
64

See Hilde G. Corneliussen & Jill Walker Rettberg, Introduction, in DIGITAL CULTURE,
PLAY, AND IDENTITY: A WORLD OF WARCRAFT READER 1, 5 (Hilde Corneliussen & Jill
Walker Rettberg eds., 2008).
65
Samit Sarkar, Blizzard Reaches 100M Lifetime World of Warcraft Accounts, POLYGON
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.polygon.com/2014/1/28/5354856/world-of-warcraft-100maccounts-lifetime [https://perma.cc/C69C-6Z4T].
66
Jonathan Leack, World of Warcraft Leads Industry with Nearly $10 Billion In
Revenue, GAMEREVOLUTION (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.gamerevolution.com/features/
13510-world-of-warcraft-leads-industry-with-nearly-10-billion-in-revenue [https://perma.
cc/NB4M-G5HF#/slide/1].
67
See Statista Research Department, Number of World of Warcraft (WoW) Subscribers
from 2015 to 2023 (In Millions), STATISTA (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/276601/number-of-world-of-warcraft-subscribers-by-quarter/ [https://perma.cc/
YF9L-QNLA].
68
Elizabeth Evans, The Economics of Free: Freemium Games, Branding and the
Impatience Economy, 22 CONVERGENCE: THE INT’L J. OF RSCH. INTO NEW MEDIA TECHS.
563 (2015).
69
Whitson Gordon, PlayStation or Xbox: Which Game Console Should You Gift?, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020, 11:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/shopping/tech-gadgets/newps5-xbox-series-x-n1245059 [https://perma.cc/XH7X-MPBS] (noting that, although some
games are available exclusively on specific platforms, “most video games come out for
both PlayStation and Xbox (as well as desktop PCs)…”).
70
See Eva-Maria Scholz, Business Models for Digital Goods: Video Games (Free-ToPlay Games), IPDIGIT (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2015/03/business-modelsfor-digital-goods-video-games-free-to-play-games/ [https://perma.cc/6SR9-BTFU].

2021]

FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES

713

smartphones, with Candy Crash Saga being the most prominent example.71 And while these games are technically free, they generate
revenue through premium (optional) in-game purchases, often labeled microtransactions.72 Tellingly, in-game purchases are far
more lucrative, on balance, than pre-paid games. In-app purchases
“generated ten times more revenue than advertising for games and
substantially more than pre-paid games.”73
The costs of developing a top-tier video game are comparable to
those of producing a feature film74 and so developers have traditionally resisted the idea of giving away content for free. But that may
be changing. In fact, recent freemium games have proven staggeringly profitable. Games like Fortnite and Apex Legends, the two
largest free-to-play games in the world as of 2019, have remained
firmly atop the sales charts for months.75

71

Dean Takahashi, Candy Crush Saga: 2.73 Billion Downloads in Five Years and Still
Counting, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 17, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://venturebeat.com/
2017/11/17/candy-crush-saga-2-73-billion-downloads-in-five-years-and-still-counting/
[https://perma.cc/9SP2-BKAY]; Matt Kamen, Five Years On, How Does Candy Crush
Keep on Crushing It?, WIRED (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/kingcandy-crush-anniversary [https://perma.cc/KHB6-7GCX]; Stuart Dredge, Why is Candy
Crush Saga So Popular?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/mar/26/candy-crush-saga-king-why-popular [https://perma.cc/6DT
T-2DS6].
72
Nenad Zoran Tomić, Economic Model of Microtransactions in Video Games, 1 J.
ECON. SCI. RSCH.17, 18 (2019) (“In gaming terminology, games that are basically obtained
free are called free-to-play games, or freemium games, and all purchases that are
subsequently performed are called microtransactions.”).
73
Kuehl, supra note 15, at 327 (citing Alexandra McDonald, Jason McDonell, &
Caroline Mitchell, Mobile Apps: Redefining the Virtual California Economy and the Laws
That Govern It, 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 86, 88
(2015)).
74
See, e.g., Luke Villapaz, ‘GTA 5’ Costs $265 Million to Develop and Market,
Making It the Most Expensive Video Game Ever Produced: Report, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), https://www.ibtimes.com/gta-5-costs-265-million-develop-marketmaking-it-most-expensive-video-game-ever-produced-report [https://perma.cc/NAW3BT4Y].
75
Phil Hornshaw, Fortnite vs. Apex Legends: Comparing Two Titans of Battle Royale,
GAMESPOT (Apr. 5, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.gamespot.com/gallery/fortnite-vs-apexlegends-comparing-two-titans-of-b/2900-2569/ [https://perma.cc/5V5N-V9PA] (reporting
that while Fortnite is still the most popular free-to-play game, Apex Legends is quickly
catching up and has drawn 50 million players in its first month).
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Framed in economic terms, in-game purchases are profitable because they are not salient. The net effect is that consumers tend to
believe that free-to-play games cost less than what they actually
do.76 Consumers hence fail to fully account for the costs of in-game
microtransactions. Behavioral economists have long recognized that
consumers are beset by a battery of systemic failures, most notably
myopia and over-optimism.77 Sellers respond to these shortcomings
by (a) crafting extraordinarily complex contracts, and (b) relying on
deferred cost schemes.78 Complex contracts offer multidimensional
benefits and charge multidimensional prices. Credit card contracts,
for example, are markedly complex: they offer annual fees, basic
interest rates, default interest rates, late fees, cash-advance fees, convenience and service fees, and so forth.79 By offering multidimensional prices, credit card issuers make it nigh impossible for consumers to accurately assess the costs of engaging in the transaction.80 And so consumers are only able to ascertain salient price dimensions—usually, the low “teaser” rates—while overlooking other
price dimensions. These low introductory (up-front) teaser rates
serve to obscure higher rates that are typically tucked into the
backend of the contract. The upshot is that consumers take note of
76

See Kuehl, supra note 15, at 327 (“What makes in-app purchases interesting is that
many consumers believe the game costs less than in normal circumstances even though it
is actually more expensive.”).
77
Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and Beyond, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 975–77 (2012) (discussing myopia and optimism as cognitive biases
that limit consumers’ capacity to observe future costs).
78
OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 6–10, 17–23 (2012) (suggesting that sellers draft contracts in
response to consumers’ systemic cognitive biases).
79
Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 77.
80
Id. at 1005–07. As Bar-Gill and Bubb observe:
[t]he behavioral theory posits that issuers offer teaser interest rates to
lower the perceived price of a given contract. Teaser rates lower the
perceived price to consumers because many of them are optimistic
about their ability to pay off an accumulated balance at the expiration
of the introductory period and consequently underestimate the
probability that they will continue to carry a positive balance after the
introductory period expires.
Id. at 1006. See also BAR-GILL, supra note 78, at 18–21 (recognizing that “[s]ellers design
contracts in response to systematic biases and misperceptions of imperfectly rational
consumers. In particular, they reduce the total price, as perceived by consumers, by
decreasing salient prices and increasing non-salient prices.”).
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the former (salient teaser rates) while glossing over the latter (nonsalient backend costs).
At the same time, consumers also tend to systemically underestimate the probability that future, seemingly far-removed costs
would apply to them. In the credit card example, consumers are
likely to assume, often despite evidence to the contrary, that they
wouldn’t incur late fees. Because consumers are overoptimistic and
myopic, they are prone to misjudge the likelihood that contingent,
deferred costs would befall them. And they tend to discount the
probability of incurring future costs or triggering contingent penalties. These systemic shortcomings limit consumers’ capacity to assess the costs arising out of a given transaction, and sellers respond
by making it harder still to understand the overly complex contracts
that govern these transactions. Sellers do so, in part, through the use
of a multilayered pricing scheme.
The use of microtransactions falls squarely within this behavioral framework. Though free-to-play games are technically free,
they offer optional features—typically, cosmetic enhancements—
that consumers can purchase with in-game currency. There are two
ways to obtain in-game currency: players can either buy it or instead
play the game and earn in-game currency by completing in-game
challenges. But, as a practical matter, the possibility of earning ingame currency through actual gameplay is elusive. Players often
have to spend months playing the game to earn only a negligible
amount of in-game currency.81 The process is slow and frustrating,
and many players ultimately prefer to simply purchase in-game currency. Elizabeth Evans has argued that developers are leveraging
“the economics of impatience,”82 taking advantage of players’ impatience by offering them a shortcut—players can simply purchase

81

See Prateek Agarwal, Economics of Microtransactions in Video Games, INTELLIGENT
ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/microtransactions/
[https://perma.cc/U9F4-YPNW] (noting that game developers make in-game rewards
particularly hard to collect, primarily because these games are ultimately designed “for
people to spend money”).
82
Evans, supra note 68, at 576–77. See also MIA CONSALVO, CHEATING: GAINING
ADVANTAGE IN VIDEOGAMES 162 (2007) (“For many players, there isn’t enough time in
their schedules to play as much as they’d like, or they are in a hurry to acquire items or
skill levels as soon as possible—sooner than normal gameplay allows.”).
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in-game currency, thus sidestepping the arduous process associated
with earning currency through lengthy gameplay.
This dynamic is fueled by consumer psychology. Microtransactions are not salient to consumers. Indeed, while the up-front price
of a video game is salient, down-the-line microtransactions are not.
People fail to fully consider future microtransactions when they
make the decision to download the game and start playing it. And
even when future costs do figure into this initial calculus, consumers
tend to underestimate how often they would actually make in-game
purchases over an extended period of time. And the fact that players
can technically earn in-game currency by simply playing the game
is likely to further compound this problem by creating the initial impression that microtransactions can be avoided altogether. Further,
microtransactions typically take the form of small increments, with
each transaction averaging only a few dollars.83 This again clouds
the aggregate costs associated with microtransactions in the long
run. People are myopic and are thus unlikely to accurately assess the
aggregate amount of money they will spend on in-game purchases
over an extended period of time.
Finally, as discussed before, game developers deploy a system
of in-game currency to further mask the true costs of acquiring ingame goods.84 Consumers are less likely to appreciate how much
money they are actually spending when they feel as if they are
spending digital, rather than real, money.85 The conversion rate between real-world and in-game currency also fluctuates frequently,
depending on various “seasonal deals” offered to consumers.86 The

83

Tomić, supra note 72, at 18 (“[M]ost of the applications for mobile operating systems
are sold at a price that falls under the category of micropayment—usually only a few
dollars.”).
84
Vanshika Dhyani, The Psychology of Freemium Games, UX PLANET (June 8, 2020),
https://uxplanet.org/the-psychology-of-freemium-games-69024d80273b [https://perma.cc
/K3MZ-595K].
85
Id. (observing that “games use a virtual equivalent of real money (coins, gems, hearts,
etc.) to create a psychological barrier between virtual spending and real currency spent”).
86
Geoffrey Goetz, Why Free-To-Play App Pricing is So Effective, and What You Can
Do About It, GIGAOM (Aug. 24, 2013), https://gigaom.com/2013/08/24/why-free-to-playapp-pricing-is-so-effective-and-what-you-can-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/J65J-HUGT].
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use of multiple conversion rates between real-world money and ingame currency serves to foster the illusion of getting a better deal.87
In sum, free-to-play games are attractive to consumers because
their salient price appears to be low—much lower than it actually is.
They generate revenues, therefore, through their nonsalient price dimensions, namely in-game microtransactions.
A note on the scope of the preceding analysis. First, this inquiry
is merely explanatory. I do not mean to suggest that free-to-play
games are normatively undesirable. While freemium games differ
meaningfully from pre-paid games, a full exploration of their merits
is beyond the scope of this Article. It’s also important to note that,
ultimately, players seem to derive a great deal of utility from the
premium digital contents they acquire. One recent study found that
78% of those who had spent $50 or more on in-game purchases felt
like they had received “their money’s worth” and were generally
pleased with their experience.88 Second, although I certainly find
this behavioral account persuasive, I argue that other factors are also
at play. As I suggest below, ideas of fairness are equally important
when considering the commercial success of free-to-play games and
the viability of the business strategy that underlies them.
Third, as this discussion illustrates, free-to-play games constitute an ongoing service. In the case of free-to-play games, the relationship between consumers and video game makers is ongoing: to
fully access all of the game’s features, including any additional “premium” cosmetic designs, players must buy into the provider’s service by constantly making in-game purchases. Video game creators,
for their part, also view these games as part of a long-term service,
and work to regularly release new (premium) digital contents that
would keep consumers engaged for a sustained period of time. The
critiques levelled against subscription models therefore apply with
equal force to free-to-play games. In particular, players must

87

Id.
Matthew Diener, Exclusive: 78% of Mobile Gamers Spending $50+ on IAP Say
They’ve Received ‘Their Money’s Worth’, POCKET GAMER (Aug. 19, 2013, 6:30 PM),
https://www.pocketgamer.biz/news/53063/exclusive-78-of-mobile-gamers-spending-50on-iap-say-theyve-received-their-moneys-worth/ [https://perma.cc/NF2C-QB4K].
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shoulder the potential risk of losing access to the game, say, when
they allegedly violate its terms of service.
Fourth, this discussion is somewhat perfunctory. It does not consider alternative revenue streams for game makers. Indeed, some developers collect and sell data about consumer habits,89 while others
rely on advertisements.90 Moreover, my analysis does not engage
with the concerns that attend the exploitative nature of in-app purchases in games marketed at children.91 Finally, this discussion does
not account for the differences between games played on mobile
phones and those played on other platforms;92 rather, it focuses on
the most conspicuous aspects shared by both.
C. Pro Gaming and Gameplay Streaming
Equipped with an understanding of the industry’s prevailing
pricing structure, we can now explore two related phenomena: competitive gaming and gameplay streams.
Competitive gaming is an ascendant trend. Competitive gamers,
often called “professional gamers,” are video game players who regularly participate in gaming tournaments.93 They compete for professional prestige, intra-community recognition, and money: gaming tournaments offer hefty monetary prize pools, sometimes to the

89

McDonald, McDonell, & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 88 (“Apps can access a mobiledevice-user’s contacts, text messages, photos and videos, credit card information, and even
facial features. They can then combine user data with the mobile device’s unique ID,
wireless signals, and geolocation history to create a down-to-the-minute profile of any user,
whether or not an app is open or in use.”).
90
Id. at 87.
91
A number of class actions have been brought against Apple and Google for promoting
games that facilitate in-game purchases by minors. See, e.g., In re Apple In-App Purchase
Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Imber-Gluck v. Google, Inc., No. 5:1401070-RMW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98899 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). Both cases are
referenced in McDonald, McDonell, & Mitchell, supra note 73.
92
See Anna Tobin, Is Mobile Phone Gaming Taking Over From Console Gaming?,
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:41 AM), [https://perma.cc/HY8E-EABA] (observing that a
number of factors—including ease of use, lower prices, and interoperability—have
contributed to the popularity of mobile games as compared to traditional video games).
93
Juho Hamari & Max Sjöblom, What Is Esports and Why Do People Watch It?, 27
INTERNET RSCH. 211, 211 (2017).
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tune of millions of dollars.94 Many tournaments are held at massive
convention centers that accommodate a diverse crowd of players,
game developers, and spectators.95 Tournaments are frequently promoted as part of a professional “tour” or “series,” where players can
win ranking points and qualify for the tour finals. The 2019 Fortnite
tour finals, for example, boasted a stunning prize pool of $100 million.96 In the past few years, gaming tournaments have been
streamed regularly on YouTube and Twitch, and occasionally aired
on ESPN.97 These tournaments have attracted millions of viewers.98
At times, gaming tournaments have overshadowed some of the biggest sporting events in the world, such as the NCAA finals.99
The analogy between competitive gaming and professional
sports strikes a familiar chord. Competitive gaming has long been
stylized as a form of “eSports,” or electronic sports. Juho Hamari
and Max Sjöblom define eSports as “a form of sports where the primary aspects of the sport are facilitated by electronic systems.”100
Michael Wagner marshals a more substantive definition that turns
on the unique skills that competitive players possess. He defines eSports as “an area of sport activities in which people develop and train
mental or physical abilities in the use of information and communication technologies.”101
94

Sam Nordmark & Jerome Heath, The Top 10 Highest Prize Pools in Esports, DOT
ESPORTS (Jan. 18, 2021), https://dotesports.com/general/news/biggest-prize-pools-esports14605 [https://perma.cc/JX6Y-SR9P].
95
See David Bloom, Esports Stadiums Are Popping Up Everywhere, FORBES (May 31,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dbloom/2019/05/31/esports-stadiums-are-poppingup-everywhere/?sh=305a38f92521 [https://perma.cc/YA7K-W4Q8].
96
Jordan Crook, Fortnite Goes Big on Esports for 2019 with 100 Million Prize Pool,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/22/fortnite-goes-big-onesports-for-2019-with-100-million-prize-pool/ [https://perma.cc/C8JX-UXP6].
97
Steven Impey, Most-Watched Esports Events Record 190.1m Streaming Hours,
SPORTSPRO (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/esports-tournamentsrecord-live-streaming-hours [https://perma.cc/57Y4-HZL6].
98
See id.
99
Jennifer Booton, 27 Million Watched This Video Game Tournament—Matching
NCAA Final Audience, MARKET WATCH (July 29, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/a-new-sports-industry-is-blossoming-online-and-its-already-worth-billions-2015-05
-29 [https://perma.cc/PND3-S2DS].
100
Hamari & Sjöblom, supra note 93, at 211.
101
Michael G. Wagner, On the Scientific Relevance of Esports, INT’L CONF. ON INTERNET
COMPUTING 437, 440 (2006).
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What motivates gamers to become competitive players? Jo
Bryce and Jason Rutter claim that the upsurge in competitive gaming springs from the social qualities of gaming. They observe that,
“[i]f public gaming events were only about gaming,” we would see
“a diminishment of [public gaming] events” following the rise of
online games.102 Donghun Lee and Linda Schoenstedt contend that
competitive drive is one of the principal motives that galvanize people to engage in eSports gaming.103 For eSports gamers, they explain, “it is important…to be better than others, to win over others,
and to be faster and more skilled in their game experience.”104 Other
commentators have likened competitive gamers to chess players,
suggesting that professional gamers need to “demonstrate persistence, discipline, and intelligence; perform with extraordinary competence under intense pressure and scrutiny; work cooperatively
with fellow workers or teammates; and achieve a high level of financial success.”105
But competitive gaming is not just about competition. It’s also
about the social experience that results from interactions between
fellow gamers. “Part of the attraction of public gaming events,”106
Bryce and Rutter note, “is not just to be challenged and compete but
to be seen to do so.”107 Indeed, it is about the underlying impulse to
“make eye contact with other members of the gaming community.”108 Relatedly, some commentators have tried to understand
why people watch competitive gaming. Hamari and Sjöblom, for
example, point to a number of factors that play a role in stimulating
eSports viewership.109 They claim that escapism, the urge to acquire

102

See Jo Bryce & Jason Rutter, In the Game— In the Flow: Presence in Public Computer
Gaming (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at [https://perma.cc/7NDD-QRVV].
103
Donghun Lee & Linda J. Schoenstedt, Comparison of eSports and Traditional Sports
Consumption Motives, 6 ICHPER-SD J. RSCH. 39 (2011).
104
Id.
105
Kyle Faust et al., Competitive and Professional Gaming: Discussing Potential
Benefits of Scientific Study, 3 INT’L J. CYBER BEHAV. PSYCH. & LEARNING 67, 67 (2013).
106
Bryce & Rutter, supra note 102.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Hamari & Sjöblom, supra note 93, at 214–17.
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knowledge about the games being played, novelty, and athlete aggressiveness all have a positive impact on eSports viewership.110
The emergence of competitive gaming has occasioned yet another related phenomenon: live gameplay streaming. Gameplay
streams are live (real-time) videos of people playing video games.111
These streams are typically run by the players themselves; in fact,
players can stream directly from a variety of gaming consoles (such
as PlayStation or Xbox) without access to an actual computer.112
The most popular platforms for live gaming streams are Twitch.tv
and YouTube.113 The former, a subsidiary of Amazon,114 is the more
popular of the two.115 Introduced in 2011, Twitch grew into a massive streaming behemoth almost instantaneously.116 The website
was the fourth largest source of peak Internet traffic in the United
States in 2014, ahead of such industry giants as Facebook and
Hulu.117 Millions of people stream on Twitch monthly, and millions
more watch these streams. With an average of 6.9 million monthly
streamers and almost 2.1 million concurrent viewers at any given

110

Id. at 211.
Keith Stuart, Fights, Camera, Action: The Beginner’s Guide to Streaming Video
Games, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/games/
2020/aug/17/beginners-guide-to-streaming-video-games [https://perma.cc/G5Y5-RMBL]
(“Streaming a game means broadcasting yourself via the internet while you play, so that
other people can watch you on their computer, phone or games console.”).
112
Id.
113
Jurre Pannekeet, More People Are Streaming on Twitch, but YouTube Is the Platform
of Choice for Mobile-Game Streamers, NEWZOO (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/more-people-are-streaming-on-twitch-but-youtubeis-the-platform-of-choice-for-mobile-game-streamers/ [https://perma.cc/LB4L-6JB6].
114
See Eugene Kim, Amazon Buys Twitch for $970 Million in Cash, BUS. INSIDER (Aug.
25, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-buys-twitch-2014-8 [https://perma.
cc/G8N2-3U5K].
115
Steve Boxer, Youtube Live Makes Inroads into Twitch’s Streaming Domination,
GREEN MAN GAMING (Apr. 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/TN64-N7RX].
116
David Hoppe, The Rise and Importance of Twitch in Esports, GAMMA LAW (June 9,
2018), https://gammalaw.com/the_rise_and_importance_of_twitch_in_esports/ [https://
perma.cc/62SD-46N7].
117
Emanuel Maiberg, Twitch Ranked 4th in Peak Internet Traffic, Ahead of Valve,
Facebook, Hulu, GAMESPOT (Feb. 9, 2014, 2:34 PM), https://www.gamespot.com/
articles/twitch-ranked-4th-in-peak-internet-traffic-ahead-of-valve-facebook-hulu/1100-64
17621/ [https://perma.cc/E37G-AABM].
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moment,118 Twitch is one of the most widely watched platforms in
the world, surpassing most television networks.
Twitch allows players to launch their own streaming channels.
Viewers can subscribe to these channels by paying a modest
monthly fee.119 This enables subscribers to obtain access to a range
of customized emojis, called “emotes.”120 Each channel features an
active chat session, a “stream chat,” where casual viewers, followers, and subscribers can interact.121 The stream chat typically inhabits a rectangular pane that stretches across the right side of the
screen. These channels—and their stream chats—are home to diverse subcommunities that bind together members of various gaming communities. As I explain in greater detail below, Twitch effectively serves as a global locus for vibrant gaming communities.
To illustrate, consider the Twitch channel run by notable Fortnite streamer Tyler Blevins, most commonly known by his online
alias “Ninja.”122 Having launched his Twitch channel in 2009,
Blevins initially streamed various multiplayer online games before
switching over to Fortnite shortly after the game’s launch in
2017.123 His popularity quickly soared. As of June 2019, he is the
most widely followed streamer on Twitch, with over fourteen million followers.124 He streams daily, typically for stretches of up to

118

Twitch Statistics & Charts, TWITCH TRACKER, https://twitchtracker.com/
statistics [https://perma.cc/UXK6-BDLL].
119
Brad Stephenson, Twitch Subscriptions: How They Work, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.lifewire.com/twitch-subscriptions-4147319 [https://perma.cc/VEL9-7WBS].
120
See Preston Byers and Gökhan Çakır, A Guide to the Most Popular Twitch Emotes,
DOT ESPORTS (Mar. 29, 2020), https://dotesports.com/culture/news/twitch-emotesmeaning-guide-23140 [https://perma.cc/4L93-Q8HK].
121
Sarah Perez, Twitch Launches Always-On Chat Rooms for Channels, TECH CRUNCH
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/15/twitch-launches-always-on-chatrooms-for-channels/ [https://perma.cc/6S67-9A2L].
122
Natalie Jarvey, Superstar Gamer Tyler “Ninja” Blevins Sets a Course for Hollywood,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 31, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6TFU-2R7E].
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Timothy J. Seppala, ‘Fortnite’ Streamer Ninja Is the First to 10 Million Twitch
Followers, ENGADGET (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-08-03-ninja-10million-twitch-followers.html [https://perma.cc/R57Z-TLVE].
124
Kevin Webb, Ninja Wants to Be More Than Just ‘The Fortnite Guy,’ But the World’s
Most Popular Gamer is Headed into Uncharted Territory, BUS. INSIDER (June 2, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ninja-fortnite-guy-pro-gamers-streamers-2019-5 [https:
//perma.cc/R66K-WA9W].
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twelve hours at a time.125 Seizing on the popularity of Fortnite,
Blevins has become something of an Internet sensation and was the
first eSports player featured on ESPN The Magazine.126 Blevins also
maintains a YouTube channel where he uploads daily “highlights”
videos extracted from his Twitch streams.127 His YouTube channel,
following in the wake of his successful Twitch channel, is steadily
expanding and has already amassed twenty-two million subscribers128 and almost two billion views to date.129
Blevins’ story is one of perseverance and success. And it is also
the story of a powerful cultural phenomenon: people love watching
gameplay streams, and do so en masse. Gameplay streamers like
Belvins have thus become modern-day celebrities. I investigate the
world of streaming in greater depth in Part III.C. below, where I examine the social norms that govern interactions between gameplay
streamers, community members, and game developers.
D. Recap
This Part provided background on emergent trends and contemporary business models in the video game industry. It first explored
the shift from physical games to digital, online-exclusive games, focusing on the various pricing models employed by game developers.
It then considered the resultant business model: modern video
games are developed, marketed, and sold on the basis of an ongoing

125

Kevin Webb, This New Video Shows How the World’s Most Popular Gamer Turned
His Basement into a Mind Blowing State-Of-The-Art Studio, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/video-ninja-red-bull-home-streaming-studio-absolutelyamazing-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/YTH7-97VF].
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2018/gaming/news/ninja-espn-magazine-cover-1202947409/
[https://perma.cc/F3HAL7HV].
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service, rather than a singular, one-off transaction. Finally, the discussion tracked two recent trends in the video game community: the
rise of competitive gaming and the emergence of gameplay streaming. In what follows, I take a step back to review the broader literature on social norms and copyright law, laying the groundwork for
my substantive analysis of extralegal gaming norms in Part III.
II.

SOCIAL NORMS: AN ONGOING INQUIRY

A sophisticated body of literature grapples with the prevalence
of social norms in creative industries.130 In the past fifteen years,
scholars have studied the extralegal norms that govern communities
of high-end French chefs,131 stand-up comedians,132 roller derby
skaters,133 drag queens,134 bloggers,135 fan fiction writers,136 fans of

130

By “social norms” I mean social conventions (rules of behavior) that (1) emerge from
decentralized processes, (2) are regularly followed out of a sense of duty, (3) and are
policed through the use of social sanctions. See Jack P. Gibbs, Norms: The Problem of
Definition and Classification, 70 AM. J. SOC. 586 (1965); Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); Eric
A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996);
JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 99 (1989); Eduardo M.
Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1919–29 (2005); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (1994); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal
Aspect of Rules, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2006).
131
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133
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Intellectual Property Without Law, 10 FIU L. REV. 133 (2014).
135
See Schultz, supra note 18, at 225–26.
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See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007); see generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, Everyone’s A Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair
Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2007).

2021]

FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES

725

jambands,137 hackers,138 documentary filmmakers,139 magicians,140
tattoo artists,141 perfumers,142 typeface designers,143 adult entertainers,144 nineteenth century publishers in the U.S.,145 software developers,146 clowns,147 graffiti artists,148 and even Hebrew authors operating in Mandate Palestine.149
A significant subset of studies focus on areas where copyright
law appears to provide little or no protection. A survey of the literature further suggests that social norms are frequently developed, directed, and inculcated by creative producers, namely authors.150
137

See Schultz, supra note 16.
See STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (2001); Tim
Jordan & Paul Taylor, A Sociology of Hackers, 46 SOCIO. REV. 757 (1998); see generally
Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne, The Economics of Computer Hacking, 1 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 511, 517–524 (2005); Orly Turgeman-Goldschmidt, Meanings that
Hackers Assign to their Being a Hacker, 2 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 382 (2008).
139
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INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S6E-U67S].
140
See Loshin, supra note 16.
141
See Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511 (2013).
142
See Cronin, supra note 16.
143
See Lipton, supra note 16.
144
See Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult Entertainment Industry,
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655 (2014).
145
See ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN (2013).
146
See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics
of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (2005).
147
See David Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1313 (2019).
148
See MARTA ILJADICA, COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW: REGULATING CREATIVITY IN THE
GRAFFITI SUBCULTURE (2016).
149
See MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
MANDATE PALESTINE (2012); Michael D. Birnhack, Hebrew Authors and English
Copyright Law in Mandate Palestine, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 201 (2011).
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Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary? Evidence
from Innovation in IP’s Negative Space, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 309, 314 (Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter eds., 2019)
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While there is a great deal of variance across different creative communities, a few examples might prove illustrative. One example is a
study by Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel on the social
norms that govern communities of gourmet French chefs.151 They
find that French chefs use three extralegal norms to protect their interests: an anti-appropriation norm that prevents chefs from precisely copying others’ recipes; a norm that prevents a chef from
passing on recipe-related information that was disclosed to her by a
peer; and a norm against the use of a recipe without crediting its
original author.152 This system of social ordering materialized despite—and, indeed, because of—the lack of copyright protection for
culinary recipes.153 So the norms embraced by French chefs complement (or perhaps subvert) the law by extending effective protection to creative works that are otherwise non-copyrightable.
A second example involves stand-up comedians. Copyright law
protects comedy to a limited extent. The fundamental problem is
that jokes often turn on a core premise or structure—an idea—and
are thus susceptible to sophisticated copying. Fellow comedians can
copy a joke by putting their own spin on it. They can do so by copying the joke’s core idea while expressing it in a different way.154

[hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?] (“These social norms
are almost exclusively producer norms, and typically reflect a shared sense of professional
or artistic identity that allows such norms to develop and become entrenched.”).
151
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 20.
152
Id. at 192–94.
153
Id. at 187–88. Indeed, U.S. courts have resisted attempts to recognize recipes as
copyrightable on the grounds that recipes constitute processes or methods of operation. The
Seventh Circuit, for example, has opined that recipes are not copyrightable because they
merely “describe a procedure by which the reader may produce many dishes.” Publ’ns
Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “there can be
no monopoly in the copyright sense in the ideas for producing certain foodstuffs”).
154
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20, at 1801–05. There are at least two additional reasons
for copyright’s lackluster protection of jokes. First, jokes are often not fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. Sometimes jokes evolve—namely, come into existence—as a result
of an exchange with members of the audience during a comedy show. Second, joke theft
poses a substantial evidentiary challenge: to mount a successful legal claim, the author
must establish that the joke was indeed stolen, rather than independently conceived by the
alleged misappropriator. Jokes generally draw on (and are closely enmeshed in) common,
identifiable life experiences. That is what makes them funny. And it is for this reason that
different comedians might often craft jokes that share similar characteristics or a common
starting point, without necessarily “stealing” from one another. See id.
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And, because copyright law does not extend to ideas,155 joke “theft”
would often fall outside the law’s positive space. As a result, infringement claims are both costly and difficult to prove. Focusing
on this low-IP environment, Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman
describe the development of a complex system of social norms designed to address copying, authorship, and joke transfer.156 These
norms are enforced through myriad extralegal sanctions, such as
group boycotts (where fellow comedians and comedy clubs refuse
to work with an infringing comedian)157 and, in extreme cases, even
violence.158
Along similar lines, Eden Sarid has studied the extralegal norms
that govern the world of drag queens. Sarid documents a system of
self-ordering that encompasses various intellectual goods: drag personae, live drag “numbers,” “signature songs” (that is, songs closely
associated with particular performers), jokes performed during a
live number, and non-signature songs.159 As Sarid explains, this
nonlegal system allows drag queens to protect a wide repertoire of
intellectual assets, including ideas and concepts.160
In short, extralegal copyright norms are largely producer-driven.
They operate within the negative space of copyright law and are usually reinforced through interactions between community members
in close-knit communities, such as those of high-end French chefs

155

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding from copyright protection “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”). See
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (noting that under copyright law, “protection is
given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself”).
156
See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20.
157
Id. at 1817–18 (“A number of interviewees told us of instances where they made clear
to comedy club booking agents that they would not appear in the same evening’s lineup
with someone they believed either had stolen their material or had a reputation of stealing
jokes… Intermediaries—club owners, booking agents, agents, and managers—sometimes
also refuse to deal with thieves.”).
158
Id. at 1819–20.
159
Sarid, supra note 134, at 148–51.
160
Id. at 150 (“Perhaps the most notable distinction between IP law and the drag domain
is the lack of distinction in the drag domain between ownership of an idea or concept [e.g.,
a signature singer] and ownership of its expression [the dance performed to the sounds of
that signature singer’s songs]. Both receive similar protection in the drag domain.”).
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and stand-up comedians.161 These norms also typically permeate
creative spaces in which the costs of innovation are relatively low.
Jokes, recipes, and drag personae are materially cheap to produce.
By contrast, industries in which innovation is costly (like the pharmaceutical industry) require significant pecuniary incentives to ensure optimal levels of innovation. Such industries are unlikely to
spur high levels of innovation through social norms alone.
Further, while social norms are often limited to the negative
space of IP, some norms map onto the positive space of copyright
law, specifically under the fair use doctrine. There are different assumptions about what constitutes fair use in different communities.
Attempts to concretize these assumptions often take shape under the
guise of codes of best practices—that is, codex-like documents that
purport to set forth principles of best practices for reproducing
works within a particular community.162 These documents, in turn,
serve as a baseline against which courts assess whether a particular
defendant has made fair use of a copyrighted work.163 Take, for example, the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying.164
This agreement aims to provide guidance on the reproduction of protected contents for the purpose of teaching or research.165 And courts
have occasionally taken this agreement to represent prevalent industry standards for reproduction, holding that noncompliance with the
guidelines might bar a defendant’s claim for fair use.166
Creative communities can also enlist such formalized tools to
fend off third-party lawsuits. A prime example is the Statement of

161

Raustiala & Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?, supra note 150, at 316
(“[M]any of these industries [in which social norms emerge] are small, though not all are.
Modest size appears to help create the sort of community of interest and sense of shared
professional identity that can originate and perpetuate robust social norms.”).
162
See Aufderheide, supra note 139.
163
See id.
164
See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, in UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS 6,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ21.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9JV-C96R] [hereinafter
“Agreement on Classroom Copying”]; see also Rothman, supra note 17, at 1918–19.
165
Agreement on Classroom Copying, supra note 164.
166
See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91
(6th Cir. 1996). But see Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).
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Best Practices in Fair Use crafted by independent documentary
filmmakers.167 Most notably, the Statement suggests that, as a general matter, filmmakers should be allowed to capture “copyrighted
media content in the process of filming something else.”168 Under
this standard, material that was captured incidentally while filming,
like a poster displayed in the background of a shot, constitutes fair
use.169 And filmmakers have been able to invoke compliance with
these practices as evidence of fair use.170 As these examples make
clear, some creative communities have successfully harnessed social
norms—written down and codified as statements of best practices—
as a shield against third-party rightsholders.
Clearance norms present yet another example of social norms
that sometimes seep into the fair use analysis.171 These norms, which
are especially ubiquitous in traditional media industries, compel
those who wish to use a work to obtain a license for doing so. And
these norms apply even when it is unclear whether the work in question is protected or whether using it would be permissible as fair use.
In Ringgold v. Black, for example, the Second Circuit reasoned that
the defendants cannot make a fair use claim because they failed to
comply with clearance norms by obtaining a license.172 The court
admonished the defendants for failing to pay the “customary price”
for the work, thus adversely affecting its licensing market.173

167

See DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005),
https://cmsimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Documentary-Filmmakers.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/36T2-3GKF].
168
Id. at 5.
169
Id.
170
See Aufderheide, supra note 139, at 30–31; Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold
Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary
Filmmakers, FINAL REP. TO CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 4, 4, 26 (2004); Thompson, supra note
139; ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., supra note 139.
171
Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 17071; Rothman, supra note 17, at 1911–16.
172
Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1997).
173
Id. at 81. The widely spread practice of licensing, even in situations where using
protected works might constitute fair use, has resulted in an increasingly narrow
interpretation of fair use as courts have come to treat the practice of licensing as part of the
works’ “potential market.” See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007). See also Matthew Africa, The
Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and
the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1160–61, 1164 (2000).
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Some scholars have offered a more systematic treatment of extralegal copyright norms. One example is the work of Jennifer Rothman. Focusing on a wide tranche of social norms, Rothman draws a
distinction between aspirational norms and litigation avoidance
norms.174 Aspirational norms aim to effectuate changes with respect
to the allocation of IP rights, while litigation avoidance norms seek
primarily to avoid or mitigate the risk of litigation.175 Rothman also
offers a vivid analysis of the ways in which courts treat social
norms—as evidence of market effects; as a proxy for what should
be done; as a proxy for what is reasonable; as evidence of what is
generally done; and as evidence of what the parties intended.176
Mark Schultz provides another excursion into the realm of nonlegal copyright norms. Schultz argues that social norms might prove
fruitful in combating online piracy.177 Because conventional strategies of deterrence and legal enforcement have largely failed, Schultz
endorses an alternative strategy consisting of educational efforts to
shape social norms. He posits that social norms, properly conceived,
can in fact drive compliance with copyright law.178
Finally, a recent contribution by Amy Adler and Jeanne Fromer
sheds light on the extralegal sanctions that routinely accompany
community norms.179 Adler and Fromer draw attention to two categories of self-help remedies: shaming and retaking of the (infringing) copy.180 Particularly fascinating is their exposition of retaking
norms—for example, the brand Suicide Girls responded to an artist’s unauthorized use of Suicide Girls photographs by “retaking”
the infringing photographs and then selling them at a low price to
undercut the infringer’s market.181 Interestingly, Adler and Former
appear to assume that this mechanism for extralegal enforcement
can arise “without the backdrop of a single close-knit community,

174

Rothman, supra note 17, at 1909.
Id. at 1909–11, 1924.
176
Id. at 1931–46.
177
Schultz, supra note 18.
178
Id. at 228–35.
179
Amy Adler & Jeanne Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property into Their Own Hands,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2019).
180
Id. at 1459–92.
181
Id. at 1463.
175
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which legal scholars tend to see as a prerequisite to enforcing extralegal norms.”182
The preceding discussion, while not exhaustive, should offer a
glimpse into the voluminous literature on social norms and copyright law. It begins by reviewing a number of extralegal norms that
populate the negative space of copyright law, and then turns to explore the interplay between social norms and positive copyright law,
focusing on the fair use doctrine and the courts’ deference to statements of best practices. Finally, it takes note of three overarching
accounts that seek to make sense of social norms as a larger phenomenon in the context of copyright law.
III.

FAIRNESS

This Part advances a tripartite argument about norms of fairness
in the video game community. First, I argue that the success of a
game is largely dependent on its widespread perception as being
competitively fair. Second, I claim that notions of fairness are also
baked into the concept of wealth sharing that informs free-to-play
games; these games offer a fully playable—though somewhat skeletal—version of the game for free, and thus generate the impression
that the game’s developers are sharing their wealth. Third, gameplay
streamers frequently cite ideas of labor in claiming ownership over
their gameplay streams. Specifically, they contend that misappropriation cuts against the time, effort, and skill that went into producing
these gameplay streams. I take up each of these issues in turn.
A. Competitive Integrity
The first cluster of fairness norms center on notions of competitive integrity in video games. Modern games are social enterprises
that derive from, and are rooted in, communities of gamers. This
also explains in part the surge in competitive gaming and gameplay
streaming. But the social aspects of video games are not entirely
182

Id. at 1457. This assessment is objectionable. Adler and Fromer discuss a number of
decentralized, largely digital communities. But these communities are no less close-knit
than traditional communities. After all, digital communities often rely on robust, online
networks of dispersed members. The gaming case study is further proof that dispersed
individuals can weave meaningful relationships on the basis of thick communitarian ties.
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distinct from their competitive qualities. Players typically form social bonds against the backdrop of some sense of communal belonging that is grounded in a desire to compete with others, and to be
seen doing so.183 And, as I suggest in what follows, the competitive
impetus that drives gaming communities is closely entangled with
the concept of fairness.
What does “fairness” mean in this context? Simply put, I argue
that a game’s commercial success is dependent on its perception as
being competitively fair. In the eyes of video game players, games
are unfair or exploitative when players can pay money—say,
through in-game microtransactions—to obtain a competitive ingame advantage. In a sense, this view is informed by the egalitarian
notion that a player’s ability to compete in the game should turn
solely on her skill, not her ability to pay.184 In a world where video
game players have come to think of themselves as “electronic athletes,” concepts of meritocracy are especially poignant. The notion
of competitive meritocracy proceeds from the proposition that everyone should get the chance to prove their worth, no matter their
financial standing.
To video game players, skill matters. Composure matters. Hard
work matters. Yet none of these qualities, however desirable, are
fully attainable when players can simply pay money to get a headstart in the game. This is because modern games are ultimately community-based enterprises by their very nature—they are meant to be
experienced by multiple players interacting with each other.185 So in
situations where some players can simply purchase an in-game advantage, others are denied the opportunity to fairly engage with
them on a level playing field. This scenario is often described by
gamers in terms of a “pay-to-win” scheme, where one’s odds of winning (or competitively engaging with others) are contingent upon

183

See supra text accompanying notes 105–108.
This is not to say that perceptions of in-game meritocracy reflect normative ideals of
fairness. Developing one’s in-game skills requires time—and time is a scarce resource for
many. Hence, it’s important to note that these perceptions rest on a narrow conception of
meritocracy; one that may not be “fair” when considered in a broader context.
185
The same is true of modern single-player games as well. These games give rise to
robust communities of players who talk about the game, help each other master it, and
ultimately experience it together.
184
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her capacity or willingness to pay in order to obtain an advantage.
As the discussion below makes evident, pay-to-win is a persistent
(and often fatal) trope within the gaming community.186
A rash of recent cases buttress this point rather markedly. A central example is the video game Star Wars Battlefront II. Launched
in 2017, Battlefront II was a successor to the game’s immensely successful first iteration.187 Though the game features a single-player
playing mode, its centerpiece is a multiplayer online mode where
dozens of players populate a Star Wars-themed digital world and
engage each other in combat.188 The players are sorted into two
teams, each consisting of players who must work in concert to
achieve a strategic goal by killing members of the opposite team.189
The characters are all drawn from the larger Star Wars universe: Jedi
Knights and rebels on the one side, Sith Lords and imperial troops
on the other.190 Jedi Knights (and related characters) are labeled “heroes” while Sith Lords (and related characters) are dubbed “villains.”191 All characters in the game are customizable and can be
186

See Kati Alha et al., Free-to-Play Games: Professionals’ Perspectives (2014)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digitallibrary/nordicdigra2014_submission_8.pdf [https://perm a.cc/XF4D-J42L] (reporting that
one of most common critiques of free-to-play games is directed at what gamers call “payto-win, which means that the players with the most money to use get unfair advantage over
players who do not use money”). See also Eustance Huang, Americans Largely Won’t Pay
to Win a Video Game—But Chinese Gamers Will, CNBC (May 30, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/pay-to-win-video-games-differences-between-us-andchinese-gamers.html [https://perma.cc/9A85-PU2C]; Jason McKinnon, The Biggest
Problem with Video Game ‘Pay To Win’ Business Models, NERD INFINITE (Oct. 13, 2017),
http://www.nerdinfinite.com/the-biggest-problem-with-video-game-pay-to-win-businessmodels/ [https://perma.cc/RXG6-5W8U]; Natalya Pomeroy, Effort Alone Isn’t Enough for
Victory with The Pay-To-Win System, STUDY BREAK (Jan. 30, 2018), https://studybreaks
.com/culture/pay-to-win/ [https://perma.cc/JAJ8-SRRR].
187
The original game, Star Wars Battlefront, was released in 2015. See Star Wars
Battlefront, ELEC. ARTS, https://www.ea.com/games/star-wars/star-wars-battlefront
[https://perma.cc/2A5K-L9LZ].
188
Jason Nichols, Star Wars: Battlefront II—Game Modes Explained, SCREENRANT
(May 31, 2020), https://screenrant.com/star-wars-battlefront-game-modes-explained/
[https://perma.cc/22NT-JWFU].
189
Id.
190
See Battlefront II Heroes and Villains, STAR WARS BATTLEFRONT WIKI: FANDOM,
https://swgames.fandom.com/wiki/Battlefront_II_heroes_and_villains [https://perma.cc/
RH9A-ENJP].
191
Id.
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equipped with various capabilities that enhance their effectiveness
in battle.192 Yet these capabilities are not randomly dispersed
amongst players; instead, they are bundled together in the form of
random “loot crates” that players can purchase with in-game currency.193 Further, some of the characters themselves were initially
locked off upon release and could only be unlocked with in-game
currency as well.194 Each loot crate held the promise of unlocking
some capabilities, characters or cosmetic designs.195
Battlefront II has been under siege from the outset. Despite being one of the most coveted franchises in the world—cast under the
umbrella of the lucrative Star Wars universe—the game’s initial
launch proved disastrous. While Battlefront II’s design was lauded
as a “monumental achievement that could only have come out of the
modern AAA studio system,”196 the game’s launch was ridiculed as
“chaotic,”197 with some suggesting it was reminiscent of “a plane
crashing into the side of the mountain.”198 Virtually every review of
the game pointed out that it was afflicted by “significant, sustained

192

See Ability, STAR WARS BATTLEFRONT WIKI: FANDOM, https://battlefront.fan
dom.com/wiki/Ability [https://perma.cc/JQ7N-MFFT].
193
See Tom Regan, DICE is Taking a ‘Good, Hard Look’ and ‘Reassessing’ Battlefront
2’ Loot Crates, FANDOM (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.fandom.com/articles/dicebattlefront-2-loot-crate-interview [https://perma.cc/76LZ-QWSV].
194
See Jason Schreier, EA Defense of Star Wars Battlefront II Becomes Most Downvoted
Reddit Comment Ever, KOTAKU (Nov. 13, 2017), https://kotaku.com/ea-defense-of-starwars-battlefront-ii-becomes-most-dow-1820396527 [https://perma.cc/P4LQ-MBZ8].
195
Some critics assert that the practice of requiring payment for loot boxes amounts to a
form of gambling. See generally Mark D. Griffiths, Is The Buying of Loot Boxes in
Videogames a Form of Gambling or Gaming?, 22 GAMING L. REV. 52 (2018); Marcus
Carter, ‘Loot Boxes’ and Pay-To-Win Features in Digital Games Look a Lot
Like Gambling, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 26, 2017), [https://perma.cc/L6JR-R79P].
196
Dave Thier, ‘Star Wars Battlefront 2’ Review: The Empire Screws Up, FORBES (Nov.
21,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/games/2017/11/21/star-wars-battlefront-2review-the-empire-screws-up/?sh=2d0661746e3a [https://perma.cc/3ZZU-89GB].
197
See Daniel Chamberlin, What Battlefront II Means for Game Monetization,
GAMASUTRA (Nov. 29, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5TS7-6X4F].
198
See Thier, supra note 196.
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criticism,”199 amounting to nothing short of a total “disaster[].”200
But the vitriol visited upon Battlefront II concerned neither its price
nor design; rather, it focused on its system of microtransactions.
As is the case with most online games today, in-game currency
in Battlefront II can be earned in one of two ways: players can either
purchase it with real-world money, or simply play the game and
(gradually) earn it. The latter option, consistent with standard ingame currency schemes, is notoriously slow and arduous. Some critics have estimated that, on average, players would have to play the
game—or “grind it,”201 as it were—for 40 hours to earn only a minute amount of in-game currency.
This microtransaction structure differs from the one described in
Part I in two meaningful ways. First, Battlefront II was not a freeto-play game; copies of the game sold for $60,202 on par with other
big-feature video games. This was somewhat unusual because most
microtransaction-based games are free-to-play. I return to this point
in Part III.B. below. Second, the premium content offered to consumers was itself different—while many freemium games limit ingame purchases to cosmetic enhancements (new designs or new
“skins” for existing characters), Battlefront II broke with this convention by offering in-game competitive enhancements; i.e., unique
capabilities that can attach to specific characters. For instance, the
character known as Emperor Palpatine, one of the game’s principal
villains, can be equipped with a lightning strike attack. In-game enhancements, however, can make this attack last longer and inflict
199

See, e.g., Matt Wales, EA Admits It “Got It Wrong” over Star Wars Battlefront 2
Loot Boxes, EUROGAMER (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-0416-ea-admits-it-got-it-wrong-over-star-wars-battlefront-2-loot-boxes [https://perma.cc/W
65P-KKQ4].
200
See Gita Jackson, A Guide to The Endless, Confusing Star Wars Battlefront
II Controversy, KOTAKU (Nov. 21, 2017), https://kotaku.com/a-guide-to-the-endlessconfusing-star-wars-battlefront-1820623069
[https://perma.cc/HFY2-R8K2];
Sean
Buckley, After Battlefront II Mess, EA Admits It Has an Image Problem, CNET (Apr. 13,
2018),
https://www.cnet.com/news/after-battlefront-ii-ea-admits-to-image-problem/
[https://perma.cc/BQ4Y-TYHX].
201
“Grinding” is defined by Techopedia.com as “playing time spent doing repetitive
tasks within a game to unlock a particular game item or to build the experience needed to
progress smoothly through the game.” Grinding, TECHNOEDIA https://www.techo
pedia.com/definition/27527/grinding [https://perma.cc/746F-BW7D].
202
See Chamberlin, supra note 197.
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greater damage on opponents.203 A “maxed-out” Palpatine, armed
with all available enhancements, could easily overwhelm opponents—especially those who have not yet acquired premium enhancements.204 Further, and perhaps more puzzlingly, Battlefront II
also offered premium characters that were accessible through ingame microtransactions.205 In particular, Darth Vader, the most
well-known character in the franchise, could only be accessed
through in-game currency.206
Players were incensed. Given the game’s multiplayer mode, the
decision to offer purchasable competitive advantages struck many
players as an act of disrepute and greed.207 The response was swift
and acute. Players felt deceived, many labeling the game a pay-towin scheme.208 As a result, sales for the game failed to meet early
projections.209 Scores of players turned to Reddit to bemoan the
game’s microtransaction system. One commenter protested that the
character Darth Vader remained inaccessible even to consumers
who had paid for a Deluxe Edition of the game.210 Others estimated
that players would have to play the game for thousands of hours in
order to earn enough in-game currency to unlock all of the game’s

203

Palpatine’s lightning attack has been described as “game-breaking” given its
effectiveness in battle. Heather Alexandra, Battlefront II’s Emperor Palpatine Was Quietly
Removed from the Game, KOTAKU (July 10, 2018), https://kotaku.com/battlefront-iisemperor-palpatine-was-quietly-removed-f-1827489522 [https://perma.cc/HN9V-7942].
204
Id.
205
See Jeff Grubb, Star Wars: Battlefront II Publisher Reduces Time to Unlock Heroes
like Darth Vader by 75%, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 13, 2017), [https://perma.cc/3BPV3ULU].
206
Id.
207
See, e.g., Alex Volkrijk, Star Wars Battlefront 2: Did EA’s Corporate Greed Ruin a
Perfect Game?, RENEGADE REP. (Dec. 18, 2017), [https://perma.cc/AP9A-RTNU].
208
See Bill Lavoy, Is Star Wars Battlefront 2 Pay to Win?, SHACK NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.shacknews.com/article/102157/is-star-wars-battlefront-2-pay-to-win [https://
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1100-6454189/ [https://perma.cc/A8XH-PYD6]; see also sources cited in supra notes 195–
197.
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Imran Khan, EA Misses Star Wars: Battlefront II Target, Plans to Reintroduce
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optional content.211 The game’s publisher, Electronic Arts (EA), issued a response on the website—yet that response sparked even
greater opprobrium and is now the most down-voted post in Reddit
history.212 EA’s stock value soon plummeted.213 The game’s average consumer score on the ratings platform Metacritic was a measly
0.9 out of 10.214
The various strands of criticism that sprung up following the
game’s release shared one common theme: an unqualified rejection
of the game’s microtransaction structure. Players were displeased
that the game offered competitive, rather than cosmetic, enhancements for consumers who were willing to shell out a few dollars.
The message, simply put, was that pay-to-win games are not competitively fair. EA relented shortly thereafter: it did away with
microtransactions altogether yet promised that an overhauled system for microtransactions would be introduced in the future.215
Moreover, in the aftermath of the controversy surrounding Battlefront II, a U.S. Senator introduced a bill to ban “loot boxes” and payto-play microtransactions.216
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The ordeal that blighted Battlefront II is by no means an isolated
incident. In the past few years, a polyphony of different games faced
vociferous criticism for allegedly running pay-to-win schemes. A
non-exhaustive catalogue includes games such as Dungeon
Keeper,217 Fallout 76,218 Borderlands 3,219 Black Desert Online,220
and ArcheAge,221 to name just a few. And a recent study conducted
by a data research company likewise concluded that:
the concept of micropayments is not fundamentally
flawed in and of itself, as only 2.4% of gamers would
rather pay for everything upfront; rather, it is the context in which the system is deployed that determines
each gamer’s response. For example, more than twothirds of gamers (68.6%) explained that ‘cosmetic
only’ micropayments are ‘okay’—i.e. they have no
problem with individual players making in-game
purchases as long as they don’t alter the core parameters of the game. As echoed by dozens of respondents, if microtransactions allow a player to make
their character or property look better, without
217

Jim Sterling, Dungeon Keeper Mobile Review—Wallet Reaper, THE ESCAPIST (Feb.
2, 2014, 4:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/L9BD-R54W] (condemning the game for hiding
“behind the mask of ‘free to play,’” while in fact requiring players to pay in order to
advance in the game).
218
Lou Contaldi, Fallout 76 Stirs More Controversy in Alleged Pay-to-Win
Microtransactions, DUAL SHOCKERS (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.dualsh
ockers.com/fallout-76-repair-kit-microtransactions/
[https://perma.cc/5TMF-CE6H]
(reporting that “Fallout 76 courts ‘utility’ microtransactions with new Repair Kits, that
strays from their original promise of keeping the Atomic Shop cosmetic only”); see also
Jester Valdez, Fallout 76 Update Brings Controversial ‘Pay-To-Win’ Repair Kits into
Play, TECH TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/241222/
20190410/fallout-76-update-brings-controversial-pay-to-win-repair-kits-into-play.htm
[https://perma.cc/3A39-C934].
219
To deflect initial pre-release reports that the game would feature pay-to-win
microtransactions, the game’s developers released a statement clarifying that the game
would only feature cosmetic in-game purchases. See Asher Madan, Borderlands 3 Doesn’t
Feature Pay-To-Win Microtransactions Says Gearbox’s Randy Pitchford, WINDOWS
CENT. (May 1, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9FFX-ACR8].
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2019), https://www.windowscentral.com/black-desert-xbox-one-pay-win [https://perma.
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altering capabilities or gameplay, the overarching
sentiment is that this presents no issue.222
Elizabeth Evans has suggested, in keeping with this theme, that
“[a]ccessing rewards that are otherwise only available via skill and
perseverance via non-gaming means is seen within much of games
culture as an antithesis to gameplay.”223 This again points to the concept of fairness and, in particular, fair gameplay. While players are
not necessarily hostile to the idea of in-game purchases as such, they
resoundingly dismiss in-game purchases that provide competitive
advantages.
But if norms of competitive integrity are well-entrenched, why
have so many game developers attempted to flout them? Why have
we seen so much friction around pay-to-win games in recent years?
The answer is that norms of competitive integrity metastasized
quickly, and some developers were likely caught off-guard by the
rapid evolution of these norms among players. So, while developers
were initially slow to catch up, the escalating discord over in-game
fairness eventually impressed upon them the need to comply with
now-familiar norms of in-game integrity.
What lessons might be extracted from this analysis? The most
important insight is that perceptions of fairness attach to games that
appear to be competitively fair. Games are thought to be competitively fair when they allow players to compete on a level playing
field. By contrast, games are deemed unfair when they offer competitive advantages via microtransactions. While players seem willing to accept cosmetic enhancements as legitimate, the same cannot
be said for competitive enhancements. Games that provide competitive enhancements are often maligned as pay-to-win schemes. And,
in a world abuzz with norms of competitive integrity, players decry
pay-to-win games as unfair. These games deny players the opportunity to engage with each other on equal terms. They thus cut
against the competitive instinct that underlies the gaming community. Players want to compete with and against each other. But
222

QUTEE, GAMING TODAY: A REPORT BY QUTEE INTO HOW PLAYERS REALLY FEEL
GAMING IN 2018, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/qutee-reports/QuteeGaming-Today-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RY-9MMB].
223
Evans, supra note 68, at 574.
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meaningful competition can only arise when players feel like everyone stands an equal chance of competing, irrespective of one’s ability or willingness to pay.
This fairness-driven account complements my discussion of behavioral economics. It explains why in-game transactions can, at
times, provoke harsh criticism from community members.224 Indeed, this brief overview demonstrates that microtransactions can
prove deleterious when they provide competitive, rather than cosmetic, advantages. Accordingly, while behavioral misperceptions
explain why in-game purchases are largely profitable,225 norms of
competitive integrity can enrich our understanding of why, in some
instances, the inverse is true.
The next subpart explores a second layer of norms, premised on
the business model of freemium games and the ways in which they
embody (concrete or illusory) ideals of wealth sharing.
B. Wealth Sharing
Freemium games are lucrative because of their pricing model.
As discussed above, a number of related factors contribute to the
popularity of these games.226 First, freemium games are successful
in part because in-game purchases are not salient to consumers, who
tend to systemically underappreciate the likelihood of making future
micropayments. Second, premium contents can only be purchased
with in-game currency, which can be earned, technically, by playing
the game. This gives rise to the impression that players can avoid
spending real-world money. Third, this system of in-game currency
serves to further camouflage the real costs associated with micropayments; to assess how much they are spending on the game over
time, players must convert real-world currency to in-game currency.
Fourth, game developers deploy a system of dynamic pricing. They
offer ever-shifting seasonal deals and bundle packages, thereby
changing the conversion rate between real-world and in-game currency on a regular basis. As a result, players are more likely to feel
like they are getting a good deal.
224
225
226

See text accompanying supra notes 76–88.
See Kuehl, supra note 15, at 327.
See text accompanying supra notes 76–88.
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Combined, these pricing techniques are particularly effective.
Yet their effectiveness hinges not only on consumer behavioral misperceptions, but also on perceptions of wealth sharing. Fortnite, the
most popular game in the world today, provides a vivid illustration.
Released by Epic Games (“Epic”) in 2017, Fortnite has taken
the world by storm.227 Widely recognized as the most popular game
in the world, Fortnite has broken a dizzying array of sales records
and has attracted millions of fans. But Fortnite was hardly Epic’s
first success story. Years before the game’s release, Epic was principally known in the industry as the company behind the Unreal Engine228—a game engine that drives dozens of the most successful
video games in the industry.229 For years, the Unreal Engine has
been leveraged to develop, power, and run a bevy of successful
games from third-party developers. In fact, the licensing market for
the Unreal Engine has traditionally been Epic’s primary source of
revenue.230
In 2012, Epic made the decision to move away from its traditional role as a licensor and publisher of boxed, marketing-driven
games. Instead, Epic sought to mutate into to a leaner company willing to give away much of its content for free.231 Initially, Fortnite
227

Kim Key, Why Fortnite Was in Beta for So Long, SCREENRANT (July 9, 2020),
https://screenrant.com/fortnite-beta-early-access-years-long-time-why/ [https://perma.cc/
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What Is Going On?, VARIETY (Dec. 18, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/
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2019, UNREAL ENGINE (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.unrealengine.com/enUS/blog/dozens-of-games-to-be-featured-in-the-unreal-engine-booth-at-gdc-2019 [https:
//perma.cc/26YP-3RR4]. A game engine is a software-development environment. It
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Jeff Ward, What is a Game Engine, GAME CAREER GUIDE (Apr. 29, 2008),
https://www.gamecareerguide.com/features/529/what_is_a_game_.php [https://perma.cc/
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was developed in-house as a side project. Epic soon realized, however, that it would make good sense to release Fortnite as a free-toplay, ever-expanding (service-based) game. In describing that decision, Epic CEO Tim Sweeney recalled: “I would describe it as seeing the writing in the wall…. There was an increasing realization
that the old model wasn’t working anymore and that the new model
was looking increasingly like the way to go.”232 At the same time,
an influx of cash from a deal with an investment company allowed
Epic to drop the monthly fee it was charging for use of its game
engine, instead extracting a royalty cut from anything created with
the engine.233 In the summer of 2017, a paid beta version of Fortnite
was released.234 A year later, in September 2018, Epic announced it
would be releasing a new, free-to-play mode called “Fortnite Battle
Royale.”235 Similar to the multiplayer mode of Battlefront II, the
Battle Royale mode was essentially a digital “sandbox” in which
100 players were engaged in combat, each vying to be the last surviving team or player. The free-to-play mode was an instant sensation. In just two weeks, it drew 10 million players.236 Within a year,
45 million players were playing the game.237 As of March 2019, as
many as 250 million gamers play the game on a regular basis.238
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The monetization scheme of Fortnite is straightforward. As a
freemium game, players need not spend a single dime to download
the game and play it. Fortnite offers players a completely free multiplayer experience.239 However, similar to other free-to-play games,
players can choose to purchase a variety of optional, premium digital goods. One example is the Battle Pass, which provides players
with access to a variety of premium costumes (“skins”), stickers, and
emotes (animated dance moves).240 Players can alternatively purchase most of the premium content separately.241 To make an ingame purchase, players must use V-Bucks, the in-game currency.
They can buy V-Bucks with real-world money or slowly earn VBucks by playing the game.242
The conversion rate between V-Bucks and real-world currency,
however, is far from straightforward: $1 is worth 100 V-Bucks,
though the more one buys, the better the deal. So, for example, a
player who spends $100 on V-Bucks would be getting 13,500 VBucks (instead of 10,000).243 Various limited deals are also on offer
at different times, as players can buy, say, a bundle of 2800 V-Bucks
for $20 (instead of $28).244 The Battle Pass runs 950 V-Bucks and
unlockable items usually go for 200 to 800 V-Bucks.245
Part of the secret to Fortnite’s success is that the game relies on
popular culture, primarily through the use of emotes—animated
dance moves derived from hip hop culture. Unsurprisingly, some
commentators have criticized the use of popular culture in Fortnite
as an attempt to profiteer from black culture. Notable hip-hop artist
Chance the Rapper, for instance, argued that “[b]lack creatives created and popularized these dances but never monetized them.
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Imagine the money people are spending on these Emotes being
shared with the artists that made them.”246
So far, the discussion moved along well-trodden lines, illustrating that Fortnite’s success can be explained on the basis of behavioral economics and a strong appeal to popular culture. Still, the core
ambition of this subpart is to bring out a previously underexplored
aspect of the game’s popularity; namely, perceptions of wealth sharing that arise among Fortnite players. In short, I argue that perceptions of fairness, couched in ideas of wealth sharing, account for
much of the success of Fortnite’s business model. As it turns out,
players have little qualms about paying for (non-competitive) digital
goods. This is largely because players feel that it’s fair: the publisher
charges nothing for the actual game—thus giving away a huge portion of its content for free—and instead charges a premium for ingame digital goods. In other words, Fortnite’s business model
proved successful because the developers appear to be sharing their
wealth. They do so by offering the basic version of the game,
stripped of many of its cosmetic elements, for free.
To clarify, I do not mean to suggest that players never complain
about Fortnite’s in-game transactions; quite the contrary, they often
bristle at what they consider too high a price for a particular in-game
design. But, importantly, these complaints are almost always isolated: players rarely, if ever, contest the practice of using in-game
microtransactions as such.
Messages posted to the Fortnite forum on Reddit underscore this
point. One user posted a message titled “V bucks are too expensive,”
challenging the price of the Battle Pass while at the same time explaining: “I feel pride in supporting the developer for once. I don’t
feel like the battle pass is a rip off or anything like that.”247 And
while that user—and other users commenting on that post—felt that
some of the unlockable designs were overpriced, they all largely
agreed that the use of in-game microtransactions is itself justified.
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Moreover, many invoked the idea of “support” and were positively
inclined to support a developer whom they trust and consider fair.
Another user responded to a different post by similarly acknowledging that “[cosmetic costumes] are 100% optional and provide no
competitive advantage. The game itself is free [ . . . ] so a lot of people want cool cosmetics as well as supporting the developers for doing an amazing job.”248 A recurring theme here is the desire to support the developers of the game. And in this context, too, players
seem to recognize the idea of competitive fairness—the notion that
no competitive advantages should be provided through micropayments. Equally important is the emphasis on the fact that the game
is free. Players appear to believe that it’s fair for the publisher to
charge money for premium designs when the publisher has no other
streams of revenue. As one player put it:
If these cosmetics are the only way that the [Fortnite]
devs are bringing in a profit, then it would make
sense that they be priced by how much it costs to develop the game as a whole. A game like [Fortnite],
with over 100 devs, has to cost a good bit of money,
therefore justifying a ‘high’ price. The whole ‘I
would buy skins if they were cheaper’ argument is
based on the false assumption of their worth. Cosmetics are merely an avenue for players to support
the further development of a great game.249
Similar sentiments have been echoed in many comments on the
Fortnite forum on Reddit.250 In fact, virtually every message
248
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contesting microtransaction prices is met instantaneously with respondents advising that in-game microtransactions are fair, even if
excessive at time, because no money is charged for playing the
game.251 And these ideas collectively draw on the trope of “supporting the devs” to offer a powerful endorsement of microtransactions.
What stems from these accounts is a fairly nuanced picture. Several ideas come to the fore. First, it is fair to charge a premium for
in-game designs given the fact that Fortnite is a free-to-play game.
Second, players express a need or desire to “support the developers”
for their perceived contribution or service to the community. Third,
and relatedly, the idea of loyalty figures prominently in players’ discussions of in-game purchases. In responding to complaints about
high prices, players often profess a sense of loyalty or commitment
toward the game’s developers.
I argue that these themes can be coherently bound together by
reference to the overarching idea of fairness as an incident of wealth
sharing. The crux of the argument is that players are engaging in
reciprocal behavior: they believe the developers to be sharing the
wealth (by not charging money for the game itself), and thus reciprocate by “supporting the devs” and displaying “loyalty” through
their embrace of in-game microtransactions.
The notion of reciprocity has roots in behavioral theory. Behavioral scientists have long touted reciprocity as a major force driving
human behavior. At first blush, the notion of reciprocity seems to
fly in the face of traditional assumptions that inform economic analysis: that is, that people seek to further self-regarding interests. But
this picture is incomplete. While some studies find that people often
behave in selfish ways under some circumstances, scholars widely
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agree that people are also meaningfully attentive to considerations
of fairness and, in particular, ideas of reciprocity.252
This literature has yielded interesting insights. What might explain the disparity between selfish and fairness-driven behavior?
Scholars believe that the notion of reciprocity can account for individuals’ willingness, or lack thereof, to engage in fairness-driven
behavior.253 People are likely to repay the actions of others by acting
in a similar fashion.254 Researchers describe reciprocity as an entrenched, almost innate, behavioral trait.255 People can tap into this
reciprocal impulse when faced with a choice about how to interact
with others.256 Specifically, as some studies have found, people are,
at core, “conditional cooperators”—they are hard-wired to cooperate, if only they perceive others to be acting in a like-minded manner.257 People tend to think of fairness in relational terms. Their actions are dependent on the actions and intentions of others. And recent studies suggest that people would go to great lengths to
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enforced by neural mechanisms).
255
See, e.g., LIXING SUN, THE FAIRNESS INSTINCT: THE ROBIN HOOD MENTALITY
AND OUR BIOLOGICAL NATURE, 99 (2013) (suggesting that fairness evolved as an
evolutionary trait).
256
See Linda Bloom & Charlie Bloom, Honoring the Rule of Reciprocation, PSYCH.
TODAY (Oct. 10, 2015), [https://perma.cc/XM6M-Y9WC].
257
Schultz, supra note 16, at 699 (observing that “[p]eople are thus conditional
cooperators. They are willing to cooperate, but their continuing cooperation depends on
what others are doing, the intentions of others, and how well others are doing (for better or
worse) relative to themselves”).
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vindicate their sense of fairness or reciprocity. Some would even be
willing to take on risks—or sustain losses—in order to “punish” others whom they perceive to have wronged them.258 Reciprocity, it
seems, is almost a fact of human nature.
As this discussion suggests, reciprocity is an incident of fairness.
People engage in reciprocal behavior because they believe that to be
fair. They do so in a host of social contexts and, most relevant to our
discussion, in their interactions with content creators. A case in point
is Mark Schultz’s study of jambands.259 Schultz investigated the social norms that pervade fan communities of jambands, such as
Grateful Dead or Phish. These bands, Schultz argues, support and
even encourage free copying and distribution of their music from
live shows, while demanding that other performances, like recorded
studio sessions, be legally purchased.260 This practice has powerful
implications for the relationships between content creators and consumers. By allowing some shows to be freely copied, these bands
are thought to be “sharing the wealth.”261 And this practice, in turn,
gives rise to a perception of fairness as fans believe that these jambands are treating them fairly, unlike other commercial bands.
Schultz thus suggests that fan communities of jambands are reciprocal and hence engender loyalty.262
The themes identified in Schultz’s study—reciprocity, fairness,
loyalty, and wealth sharing—all play a role in the gaming community. As discussed above, players often enlist ideas of loyalty, fairness, and wealth sharing (as a manifestation of reciprocity) in their
interactions with game developers and fellow community members.
Perceptions of wealth sharing abound among players. And these perceptions, I argue, account for at least some of Fortnite’s success,

258

Id. at 700 (referencing Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 252, at 818) (“People will
cooperate and incur a cost in order to punish others—for example, socially snubbing
somebody who violates community norms or taking a risk to steal from an employer who
is perceived as unfair.”).
259
Id. at 653, 668.
260
Id. at 668–91.
261
Id. at 714 (quoting a fan as saying: “While I have never seen the band, I have heard
them many times through this site….These types of bands are small and not wealthy but
let us listen to their music for free.”).
262
Id. at 688–89.
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because they legitimate the game’s microtransaction structure and
catalyze players to “support the devs” and display loyalty.
C. Labor
The third subset of fairness norms arise out of gameplay streams.
As discussed above, gameplay streams are self-produced, live videos of people playing video games. The most popular platform for
gameplay streams is Twitch, where players can set up their own
channels, amass throngs of followers, and solicit donations.263
Gameplay streams on Twitch are accompanied by concurrent live
“stream chats,” where viewers can interact both with each other and
with the streamer.264 Some streamers, though not all, superimpose a
graphic “overlay” on their videos: an overlay is a graphic feature
that usually displays the streamer’s name and logo, as well as various design elements that the streamer finds desirable.265 Streamers
can also design custom emojis, called emotes, to be used by subscribers in the stream chat. Gameplay streams often stretch for hours
on end—it’s not at all uncommon for a popular streamer to stream
for eight hours straight.266 In addition, streamers are expected to interact with their audience, so they must play the game while remaining fairly responsive to messages posted to the stream chat.267
This subpart explores the norms of fairness underlying gameplay
streams. It begins by examining the norm against perceived misappropriation of gameplay streams. It then delimits with greater
263

How Twitch.tv Works and Its Business Model, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/articles/investing/082115/how-twitchtv-works-and-its-business-model.asp
[https://perma.cc/SF3M-DWA7].
264
See text accompanying supra notes 118–124.
265
The demand for graphic Twitch overlays has ballooned in recent years, with hundreds
of websites and designers offering overlay design services for pay. See, e.g., TWITCH
OVERLAY,
http://twitchoverlay.com
[https://perma.cc/55F6-HAEB];
STREXM,
http://strexm.tv [https://perma.cc/HLR6-34N3]; STREAMLABS, http://streamlabs.com
[https://perma.cc/S6VV-GTDS]; STREAMPLAY, http://streamplaygraphics.com [https://
perma.cc/SGT7-R95Q].
266
See infra Section III.C.5.
267
See William A. Hamilton, Oliver Garretson, & Andruid Kerne, Streaming on
Twitch: Fostering Participatory Communities of Play Within Live Mixed Media, PROC. OF
THE SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1315, 1316 (Apr. 2014),
https://ecologylab.net/research/publications/streamingOnTwitch.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7
QZ-PAKW].
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precision the contours of that norm, betraying some of the ambiguity
and nuance associated with its application. It next outlines the mechanisms used to enforce that norm, before turning to consider the
workings of copyright law, explaining why the law is only partly
calibrated to protect gameplay streams.
1. Misappropriation Norm
Streamers often take direct steps to deter against misappropriation of their gameplay streams: they frequently submit takedown notices268 or bring claims via YouTube’s Content ID system.269 They
also take to Twitter and other platforms to shame alleged infringers
and call attention to infractions of their perceived rights.
The prototypical case of infringement involves YouTube: infringers often record, in whole or in part, Twitch gameplay streams
and then repost them on YouTube.270 One notable streamer, for example, posted a message to Twitter announcing that he had successfully taken down a YouTube video featuring contents lifted from his
Twitch streams.271 Another streamer posted a message suggesting
he had similarly been able to take down an infringing YouTube
video, labeling the purported infringer a “leech.”272 And even some
of the biggest streamers in the world, such as Richard Blevins, have
previously intimated that they would not hesitate to take down “infringing” videos.273 Moreover, many streamers affix ominous copyright notices to their streams. These notices typically caution against
268

See text accompanying infra notes 325–327.
See Rebecca Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This Will Happen
Again: Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447, 1457–78 (2015)
(reviewing YouTube’s Content ID system).
270
See, e.g., Luke Winkie, That Highlight Channel You Love Isn’t Exactly Legal, But It
Isn’t Going Anywhere Either, DOT ESPORTS (Sept. 12, 2016, 09:12 AM),
https://dotesports.com/hearthstone/news/twitch-youtube-highlight-channels-legality-3872
[https://perma.cc/YC2S-A929] (describing the work of a famous YouTube channel whose
contents consist of clips lifted from Twitch and other YouTube channels). In the balance
of this Section, I will outline a number of other prominent examples.
271
Curtis McCall (@RewindNV), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 6:40 PM), https://
twitter.com/RewindNV/status/1098366880480251905 [https://perma.cc/Z25W-E57S].
272
Ryan Amaechi (@SylverRye), TWITTER (June 3, 2019, 9:01 PM), https://twitter.com/
SylverRye/status/1135713144427483137 [https://perma.cc/ Z3L2-72W9].
273
H3 Podcast Highlights, Ninja Addresses Jake Paul Clickbaiting Him, YOUTUBE (Apr.
23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7QT6-2R2H] (starting at 1:45).
269
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the copying or “stealing” of streaming content. One such notice,
posted by a prominent Twitch streamer, warned that “[a]ny channel
that post[s] this stream content other than [the streamer] on
YouTube…infringes upon rights to my content [and] will be penalized accordingly.”274 Another streamer appended to his channel a
brief notice pleading “[d]on’t steal my content, you shady YouTube
channels.”275 Yet another popular streamer quipped, “[s]weet, now
we got people stealing footage. Copyright strikes going out.”276
Some streamers voice concern over the technological means by
which copying of streams in made possible. A notable streamer of
Mortal Kombat, for example, decried the game’s recording function,
which allows players to access in-game recordings of matches
played by others.277 Players can enable automatic recording of their
in-game matches, and these recordings are then generated and stored
on the game’s servers.278 This feature has allowed alleged infringers
to lift contents (namely, gameplay footage) directly from the game’s
servers. Thus, to reproduce a player’s gameplay video, potential infringers need not access the player’s Twitch stream: they can simply
access the recordings stored on the game’s servers.279

274

See Screenshot of Twitch Stream Hosted by KHTX_Scar on March 13, 2019 (on file
with author).
275
See Screenshot of Twitch Stream Hosted by LTH_BigD on March 13, 2019 (on file
with author).
276
Carl White (@PerfectLegend), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 2019, 12:13 AM),
https://twitter.com/PerfectLegend/status/1107495324594176000 [https://perma.cc/Y44ZS4BM].
277
Destroyer (@DestroyerFGC), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2019, 9:45 AM),
https://twitter.com/DestroyerFGC/status/1122859447360065536 [https://perma.cc/2ENSDA2S.]
278
Andrew Burnes, Mortal Combat 11 Adds NVIDIA Ansel and Highlights On PC,
NVIDIA (May 17, 2019), https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/geforce/news /mortal-kombat11-pc-nvidia-ansel-highlights/ [https://perma.cc/SN4A-BSCV].
279
Why would potential infringers try to avoid lifting contents from a player’s Twitch
stream? The answer is that, while it is unclear whether gameplay streams are themselves
protected, they typically feature other protected elements: a graphic overlay as well as a
recording of the streamer’s voice. As a result, potential infringers are able to minimize their
legal exposure by directly extracting gameplay videos from the game’s online servers, thus
sidestepping the need to record Twitch streams (and their accompanying overlays and
voice recordings). I say more on the legal protection of gameplay stream in Part III.C.4
below.
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Many streamers describe the unauthorized use of one’s streams
in terms of “theft” or “stealing.” Some even suggest that the unauthorized use of streams is comparable to the widespread practice of
file-sharing in the music industry.280 To illustrate, consider the crusade launched by two famous streamers, known by their online
pseudonyms Pokimane and ZeRo, against what they call “content
theft.”281 ZeRo, whose real name is Gonzalo Barrios, is a popular
streamer of the game Super Smash Bros., attracting thousands of
viewers every night on Twitch. In a lengthy message posted to Twitter, Barrios complained that “people…tak[e] chunks of [his]
stream[s] and put[] them on YouTube to make money themselves.”282 He further clarified that this practice regularly takes the
shape of compilation-like “highlights” videos based on various clips
lifted from his stream, or specific matches cropped out of his stream
and uploaded to YouTube as distinct videos.283 Denouncing such
appropriations as “wrong,” Barrios warned that he will take steps to
remove infringing videos and further asked that fans alert him to
future violations.284
Another probative example is the controversy surrounding popular streamer Pokimane, whose real name is Imane Anys.285 After a
YouTube user uploaded a video consisting of clips from Pokimane’s
channel, she hastily placed a copyright strike on the user’s channel,
exclaiming that she will not tolerate perceived misappropriations of
her streams.286 These sentiments are reflective of the deeply held
280

Brant McCaskill (@Bambamguitar), TWITTER (June 6, 2019, 12:24 PM),
https://twitter.com/bambamguitar/status/1136670299024429058 [https://perma.cc/SX5SR9VQ].
281
Steven Asarch, Twitch Streamers Pokimane and ZeRo Fight Against Content Theft,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 2, 2019, 3:28 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/zero-pokimane-twitchstream-content-theft-compilation-youtube-1277476 [https://perma.cc/QW2T-V8YK].
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id. Some high-profile streamers believe that Pokimane’s frequent use of the copyright
strike system is excessive or otherwise abusive. See, e,g., Virginia Glaze, KEEMSTAR
Accuses Pokimane of Abusing YouTube’s Copyright System, DEXERTO (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://www.dexerto.com/entertainment/keemstar-accuses-pokimane-of-abusingyoutubes-copyright-system-266637/ [https://perm a.cc/9DJY-BBPK] [hereinafter “Glaze,
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views of streamers and fans in the gaming community. A user on
Reddit, for instance, castigated alleged violators as “thieves,” asserting that YouTube needs to do more to combat “content stealers” who
profit from “stolen videos.”287 The user then listed a number of
“compilation channels” known for lifting streamers’ content.288
In sum, streamers guard against perceived misappropriations of
their streams. Community members view gameplay streams as proprietary intellectual goods owned by streamers. Accordingly, alleged violators are often chastised as “thieves” or “content stealers”
worthy of rebuke.
2. Defining Misappropriation
The norm against misappropriation of gameplay streams is
somewhat nuanced. Though framed in broad terms, it is subject to
several contested limitations. First and foremost, many streamers
appear to hold the view that appropriation of their streams is permissible to the extent that it is transformative—namely, that it adds
value to the original stream.289 One can add value to the original
stream by editing, slashing, or mixing stream content with other content. Transformative use of gameplay streams must also reflect, generally speaking, the appropriator’s own creative voice. So, to escape
infringement, alleged appropriators need to make significant
changes to the lifted stream, either by mixing it with some other
content or by editing it in a way that would mirror the appropriator’s
own voice.

Keemstar Accuses Pokimane”]; Virginia Glaze, PewDiePie Calls Out Pokimane for Copy
Striking Smaller YouTube Channels, DEXERTO (Jan. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/29EEW473] [hereinafter Glaze, PewDiePie Calls Out Pokimane].
287
u/TexBoo, @YouTube why are Twitch compilation channels allowed to Monetize
content? They are nothing more than content stealers and there are multiple posts, videos
and forum threads about this. Even large Youtubers with millions of subscribers are talking
about it. Yet you allow it?, REDDIT (Sept. 16, 2018, 4:13AM), https://www.reddit.com/
r/youtube/comments/9g7rze/youtube_why_are_twitch_compilation_channels/ [https://per
ma.cc/6VBW-GFWW] [hereinafter Twitch Compilation Channels].
288
Id.
289
Willie Clark, The (Still) Uncertain State of Video Game Streaming Online, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 28, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2018/01/to-stream-or-not-tostream-how-online-streaming-game-videos-exist-in-an-ip-world/ [https://perma.cc/BW9G
-QKCL].
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Much like gameplay streamers, courts also look to transformative use in excusing copyright infringement. They do so under the
fair use analysis. Fair use is the principal defense to copyright infringement.290 Whether a particular use is fair is assessed against
four factors.291 The first and arguably most important factor involves
the character and purpose of the use—courts are asked to consider
whether the use is commercial and, more importantly, whether it is
transformative.292 This requirement aligns with the notion of transformative use embraced by steamers; it recognizes as transformative
any use that adds “something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”293
But while many streamers seem to accept that transformative use
is permissible in theory, few agree on what this actually means in
practice. Let us consider again the two cases described above—the
incidents involving Twitch streamers Pokimane and ZeRo.
Pokimane herself was quoted as recognizing that copying her
streams would be permissible if “you edit videos and actually put
effort into it and make it more entertaining for the viewer.”294 Content from Pokimane’s stream, recall, was used by another YouTube
user. Yet, strikingly, the video in question did not involve wholesale
290

Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV.
1102, 1141 (2017) (“The most important defense to copyright infringement is fair use.”).
291
The fair use doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted
work…is not an infringement of copyright.”). See William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (1988); see generally Pamela
Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815 (2015); Clark D. Asay et
al., Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C.L. REV. 905 (2020).
292
Asay et al., supra note 291, at 906.
293
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). As the court
explained,
[a]lthough such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee
of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use.
Id.
294
See Asarch, supra note 281.
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copying on the part of the alleged infringer; rather, it offered commentary on controversies in which Pokimane was embroiled at the
time.295 In his video, the alleged infringer included cropped-out
Pokimane clips intermixed with clips and screenshots of another
YouTuber with whom Pokimane was supposedly feuding.296 And,
as other notable streamers emphasized, this sort of use surely qualifies as transformative by community standards.297 The purportedly
infringing video was heavily edited and no doubt involved effort and
commentary on the part of the secondary user. Thus, lofty ideals
aside, Pokimane appeared willing to recognize transformative use
as permissible in theory, but grappled with applying this concept in
practice, at least when her own content was at issue.298
Similar lessons might be gleaned from the incident involving
Gonzalo Barrios, known by his online pseudonym ZeRo.299 As explained previously, Barrios published a widely discussed Twitter
post complaining that his Twitch streams are frequently lifted and
reposted on YouTube.300 But, in keeping with community norms,
Barrios nonetheless acknowledged that subsequent transformative
use would not be offensive to his (perceived) rights. He noted that
he does not necessarily object to any secondary use of his Twitch
streams, claiming that it would be “great to see” videos in which
third parties provide commentary on matches they had played

295

See Bowblax, Keemstar vs. Pokimane Twitter Fight—Bullying SSSniperWolf Fanboy,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9qhlsHrA50 [https://per
ma.cc/RGL7-538W].
296
Id.
297
See Glaze, Keemstar Accuses Pokimane, supra note 286; Glaze, PewDiePie Calls Out
Pokimane, supra note 286.
298
Josh Katzowitz, YouTuber Pokimane Defends Herself Against PewDiePie’s
Copyright Criticism, THE DAILY DOT (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.dailydot.com/
upstream/pokimane-pewdiepie-youtube-copyright-claims/
[https://perma.cc/HWV37XHA]. Pokimane’s response likely betrayed the true reason behind her decision to take
action against the alleged infringer—the latter’s video painted an unfavorable picture of
her, and Pokimane therefore wanted to remove the video to protect her reputation. “That
video was getting a lot of traction at the time,” she said, “and being completely honest, I
kind of wanted to be over with all the petty drama.” Id.
299
Andrew Cohen, Facebook Gaming Signs Super Smash Bros. Star Gonzalo ‘ZeRo’
Barrios, SPORTTECHIE (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.sporttechie.com [https://perma.cc/
EQ8R-7GV3].
300
See Asarch, supra note 281.

756

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:694

against him.301 Barrios intuited that, in such cases, he might see
value in contributing his work to someone else’s project and further
asked that secondary users directly inquire with him about the use
of his videos.302 This view is seemingly consonant with the general
approach to transformative use in the streaming community;
namely, that secondary use is permissible insofar as it adds something new to the original video.
That said, this view also risks narrowing the scope of transformative use by mandating that any secondary use—including ostensibly permissible transformative use—be subject to clearance by the
owner of the original video stream. Should Barrios be the one to
make the ultimate determination as to whether the use is transformative? On this view, the task of adjudicating transformative use is
entrusted to the owner of the original video, and her alone. This procedural limitation is alarming because (perceived or actual)
rightsholders are naturally predisposed to find that secondary uses
are non-transformative more often than not.
In addition to transformative use, a number of other limitations
cabin the scope of the anti-appropriation norm identified above. One
such limitation stems from the nature of online games—players typically face off against other players. As a result, it is commonly accepted that, if a streamer engages with another player online, the
latter is herself allowed to upload a self-recorded video depicting her
match (or set of matches) with the streamer.303
Another extenuating factor circles around the question of
whether the original streamer uploaded her contents to YouTube.
The issue recently came to a head in a lengthy Twitter discussion
ignited by a notable streamer who complained about his Twitch videos being lifted and reposted to YouTube.304 Though most commenters sympathized with the streamer, a substantial subset of the
comments pointed out that the streamer had not uploaded his
streams to YouTube; as one commenter suggested, the alleged

301

Id.
Id. (“ZeRo has asked those that want to use his content to email him first….”).
303
Id. (recognizing that other players may upload videos of matches they had played
against the streamer).
304
See Amaechi, supra note 272.
302
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copier was actually doing the streamer a favor—by reposting the
streamer’s video on YouTube, the copier helped him gain “extra followers.”305 Others noted that the streamer himself does not operate
a YouTube channel, hence suggesting that such infringers in fact
take on the role of “good marketing managers [who are] boost[ing]
[the streamer’s Twitch] channel.”306 Still other commenters observed that, while community members would rather watch “official” videos uploaded by steamers themselves, “availability is
huge.”307 Put another way, people hunger for high-quality streaming
content and will watch “unofficial” content ripped from streamers if
no “official” content is available.308 And while some users conceded
that the streamer could potentially profit from posting his videos
himself, others countered that the infringer is generating “coverage
and exposure”309 from which the streamer might benefit. In doing
so, the infringer is providing access to content that is otherwise inaccessible. The implication is that the original streamer does not
maintain a YouTube channel himself and therefore cannot claim to
be harmed by alleged infringers.
This episode tees up rather elegantly the potential limitations of
a broad anti-appropriation norm: if the original Twitch streamer
does not post her contents to YouTube, others might be justified in
doing so. This view can be explained on the basis of monetary harm.
Because the original streamer does not monetize gameplay streams
by uploading them to YouTube, the streamer wouldn’t be harmed
by unauthorized third-party uploads. Alternatively, this view can
also be motivated by the desire to ensure public access to gameplay
streams: by uploading streams to YouTube, alleged infringers are
305

See comment by Nazeyr (@TheVezc), TWITTER (June 3, 2019, 9:04 PM),
https://twitter.com/TheVezc/status/1135713830170812416
[https://perma.cc/EXQ8BLBQ].
306
See comment by Ejyptian (@Ejyptian), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 2:10 AM),
https://twitter.com/Ejyptian/status/1135790789643132928
[https://perma.cc/8VZVV596].
307
See comment by Zachary T. (@PrismoNasty), TWITTER (June 3, 2019, 9:14 PM),
https://twitter.com/Prismonasty/status/1135716500504027142 [https://perma.cc/9U4PY9TH].
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See id.
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See comment by Ravishing Rick (@Longfut_), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 4:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/LONGFuT_/status/1136008352373313536 [https://perma.cc/RG4CMH7W].
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facilitating wider dissemination of such works. Indeed, people derive a great deal of pleasure from watching gameplay streams.310
And so community members are less likely to take issue with alleged infringements when such infringements implicate streamers
who never, or practically never, post on YouTube themselves.
Taken together, these considerations correspond closely to the
underlying balance that copyright law seeks to strike between incentives and access.311 The law embodies a measured tradeoff between
two competing considerations: providing sufficient incentives to
creators and ensuring that works of authorship ultimately become
accessible to society at large. These concerns mirror the debate over
whether the streamer is required to post her own contents to
YouTube. By failing to do so, she might prevent the dissemination
of her work, thus limiting its accessibility. And failure to post
streaming content on YouTube might also suggest that YouTube
monetization plays little role in incentivizing the original creator.
To put it more concretely, these policy considerations—incentives and access—both pull in the same direction. They support a
finding of non-infringement when the streamer failed to independently post contents to YouTube. They arise out of a system of
community norms yet appear to comport with the broader policy
goals underpinning copyright law.
Discussions along these lines are fairly common. Most gamers
agree that streamers hold rights to their gameplay streams, but there
remains a significant minority of community members who appear
to believe that misappropriations can be excused where the original
streamer fails to post her contents to YouTube.312 These observations are consistent with the literature on the psychology of copying.
Scholars have found that, although people often view copying as inherently wrong, they are also inclined to consider a host of fairnessdriven factors in excusing infringement, such as whether the copier

310
311
312

See text accompanying supra notes 102–103.
See infra Section IV.A.
See text accompanying supra notes 304–309.
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benefited from the copying, what the copier’s intent was, and so
forth.313
In short, the norm against misappropriation of gameplay streams
is subject to one principal qualification: transformative use. Apart
from transformative use, community members recognize two additional checks on streamers’ rights: (i) a player who directly engages
in-game with the streamer is allowed to monetize her self-recorded
matches with the streamer; and (ii) whether the streamer herself uploaded her contents to YouTube might be relevant in considering
infringement, though it appears that community members are divided on this score.
3. Enforcement
Players communicate about repeat infringers. They identify,
name, and shame known offenders. And they often help other
streamers detect infringing videos by policing the YouTube and
Twitch channels run by such repeat infringers.314 In one case, a
prominent streamer took to Twitter to acknowledge that a fellow
streamer had notified him of an alleged misappropriation of his
stream.315 And consider again the case of Gonzalo Barrios, whose
now-famous Twitter post impassionedly implored community
members to assist him in an effort to combat stream “stealing.”316
These cases illustrate that norm enforcement is often a collective
undertaking: community members and streamers work together with
an eye toward policing norm violators.
Gamers frequently identify repeat infringers.317 Condemning
such infringers as “leeches” or “vultures,”318 gamers respond to
norm transgression by invoking social sanctions—that is, by inflicting reputational harm through the use of negative campaigns and

313

Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2466 (2016).
314
See, e.g., Twitch Compilation Channels, supra note 287.
315
See H3 Podcast Highlights, supra note 273 and accompanying text.
316
See Asarch, supra note 281 and accompanying text.
317
For example, consider the case described in the text accompanying supra notes 287–
288 (a Reddit post providing a long list of infringing YouTube channels to assist streamers
with identifying norm contravention).
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Id.
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shaming.319 The gaming community is surprisingly tight-knit; different sub-communities typically emerge around different video
games.320 These communities are often divided into two classes of
players: casual and professional. Professional gamers, as opposed to
casual ones, engage in competitive gaming.321 And, perhaps more
importantly, competitive gamers occupy a position of visibility
within the community—they have a large audience on social media
and are widely recognized as community leaders.322 Thus, they
wield considerable power and influence, and are well-positioned to
dispense harsh reputational sanctions to deter infringers. Social
stigma is especially effective as a tool for policing norm violation.323
And, to be sure, message boards and social media have greatly contributed to the dissemination of negative gossip as a means of enforcing community norms.
Last but not least, gamers also employ formal self-help remedies. Specifically, they often issue takedown notices324 pursuant to

319

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 57
(1991) (discussing “negative gossip” as a tool for enforcing social norms). The literature
on social norms is often traced back to Ellickson’s influential book, which focused on
ranchers in Shasta County, California. Ellickson found that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, Shasta County ranchers operated with little attention to formal property law, and
instead subscribed to a system of extralegal norms.
320
Keith Stuart, Gamer Communities: The Positive Side, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/gamesblog/2013/jul/31/gamer-communitiespositive-side-twitter [https://perma.cc/G9RE-UZ6R] (recounting the history of gaming
communities and discussing a number of examples of sub-communities that arose around
different games).
321
See Jayson van Kerckhoven, Casual vs. Competitive Gaming: What Are The
Differences?, CRITICAL HIT GAMING (July 5, 2018), https://www.criticalhit.net/
gaming/casual-vs-competitive-gaming-differences/ [https://perma.cc/QMC5-ZVRD].
322
See, e.g., The Fortnite Team, Creative, EPIC GAMES (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/creative [https://perma.cc/YJ7 9-2ZYX]
(identifying the YouTube channels of “Fortnite’s most imaginative community leaders”);
Henry Choi, How to Get a Fighting Game Community to Thrive and Grow, EVENT HUBS
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.eventhubs.com/news/2017/dec/02/how-get-fighting-gamecommunity-thrive-and-grow/ [https://perma.cc/WL72-DGMV] (identifying “community
leaders” in three subcommunities of popular fighting games).
323
Fagundes, supra note 133, at 1127 (discussing the centrality of social norms to
enforcement of derby-name norms); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20 (analyzing
enforcement of the social norms that govern standup comedy).
324
See text accompanying supra notes 271–272.
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Section 512 of the Digital Copyright Millennium Act (DMCA),325
which shields service providers from copyright liability so long as
they meet a number of statutory requirements. In particular, the service provider must act expeditiously to remove infringing content
upon acquiring actual or “red flag” notice of infringement.326 The
process for submitting a takedown notice on YouTube is fast and
simple: in essence, streamers need only fill out a brief online form
and identify the source material that was allegedly copied.327
Takedown notices are thus an efficient means of redressing norm
infraction. But, as will become apparent in the next section, it’s not
clear what rights, if any, streamers may actually assert in their gameplay streams. Their use of legal self-help tools is therefore questionable. Streamers seem to believe, in conformity with community
norms, that gameplay streams are their legal property.328 Yet that is
debatable, as the remainder of this Part suggests.
4. Gameplay Streams: The Law
Community members may leverage any number of legal strategies in asserting legal exclusivity over their gameplay streams. Most
325

17 U.S.C. § 512.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Section 512(i) further requires service providers to adopt a
reasonably implemented policy for terminating repeat infringers “in appropriate
circumstances.” § 512(i).
327
Submit a Copyright Takedown Request, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.
com/youtube/answer/2807622?hl=en [https://perma.cc/88DY-5EMJ].
328
It’s worth noting that, at least nominally, Section 512 provides some procedural
safeguards to prevent misuse. For example, Section 512 mandates that, in issuing a
takedown notice, copyright holders must have a “good faith belief that the use of the
material” was at odds with their rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v), 512(f) (creating a
cause of action for bad faith assertion of copyright or fair use). Although the Ninth Circuit
has held that copyright holders must consider fair use in good faith before submitting a
takedown notice, courts have often interpreted the good faith clause as requiring only a
subjectively held state of mind. See Lenz v. Univ. Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2015). For that reason, the good faith requirement would be of little use to the vast majority
of users. Most users are non-sophisticated and risk-averse, and are thus unlikely to avail
themselves of the safeguards specified in Section 512. But see Sheri Pan, Lenz v. Universal
Music: Ninth Circuit Amends Opinion to Broaden Fair Use Protections in DMCA
Takedowns, JOLT DIGEST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/ninth-circuitamends-opinion-to-broaden-fair-use-protections-in-dmca-takedowns [https://perma.cc/
SY7V-UKPU] (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s revised opinion in Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp., where the court held that the copyright owner’s assessment of fair use before filing
a takedown notice must be reasonably extensive).
326
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notably, copyright law presents a readily accessible avenue for legal
protection. Copyright law is likely to extend to two features that are
common to many Twitch streams: a graphic overlay and the
streamer’s recorded voiceover. Assuming that it is original, a
graphic overlay appears to be a protectable graphic work.329 While
many overlays share common themes with respect to colors and
standard design elements, they should normally qualify for copyright protection under the law’s minimalist originality standard.330
Similarly, the streamer’s voiceover is also likely to qualify for copyright protection as an original sound recording.331 And while the
law requires that protected works be fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, overlays and voice recordings satisfy this standard
simply by being captured in the streamer’s video.332
The recording of a streamer’s voiceover could nonetheless be
challenged on the grounds that it merely embodies an unprotected
idea rather than a protected expression.333 Streamers do not follow a
script. They engage with their audience by responding to queries,
questions, or comments posted in the stream chat.334 In effect, the
streamer’s comments during the live stream resemble a form of a
conversation—a conversation between the streamer and her

329

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” as protected
subject matter).
330
See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1990), where Justice
O’Connor clarified that some degree of creativity is essential to originality. She further
rejected the “sweat of the brow” doctrine that some lower courts had embraced in holding
that works of authorship should be protected inasmuch as their authors expended time and
effort to create them. See id. at 345, 359–60, 362. At the same time, Justice O’Connor made
clear that the amount of required creativity is minimal, stating that “[t]he requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude,
humble or obvious’ it might be.” Id. at 345.
331
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (defining sound recordings as protectable subject matter).
332
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work as “fixed” when it is “sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration”).
333
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
334
Engaging Viewers, CREATOR CAMP: TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/creator
camp/en/level-up/engaging-viewers/ [https://perma.cc/EF5A-TNEZ].

2021]

FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES

763

audience.335 And some courts have been hesitant to recognize copyrights in interviews and spontaneous conversations, reasoning that
these forms of spontaneous speech reflect unprotected ideas or otherwise fail to meet the threshold for minimal creativity.336
Another problem stems from streamers’ use of voice-chat software to chat with fellow gamers while streaming. A recorded conversation between multiple parties could result in a copyrightable
sound recording. But who owns the recording? To establish co-authorship under U.S. copyright law, putative co-authors must demonstrate their mutual intent to create a work of joint authorship.337 The
requirement of mutual intent presents a substantial challenge.338 In
the absence of co-authorship, courts may find that a multiparty
sound recording amounts to a collective work consisting of multiple
independent contributions.339 In this scenario, each contributor
holds rights to her separate contribution (provided that it is independently copyrightable). If this were the case, streamers would be
barred from claiming sole ownership over gameplay streams in
which they interacted audibly with multiple other contributors. Alternatively, the streamer could claim to be the sole author of the entire integrated sound recording. Yet that seems unlikely, because the
streamer would be required to show that she exercised authority and
control over the whole work to such an extent that she in fact

335

Of course, when Twitch chats involve hundreds and thousands of participants, a
traditional conversation is less likely to materialize. See Azadeh Nematzadeh et al.,
Information Overload in Group Communication: From Conversation to Cacophony in the
Twitch Chat, 6 ROYAL SOC. OPEN SCI. 1 (2019).
336
See, e.g., Falwell v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207–09 (W.D. Va.
1981); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 808 F.Supp.2d 634, 635–36
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C. 1980). But
see Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. 1968); Found.
for Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, Inc. v. Alcon Entm’t, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00509-LMM
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2016).
337
17 U.S.C. § 201 (defining “joint work” as a work “prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole”).
338
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that putative
coauthors must “make objective manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors”).
339
17 U.S.C. § 201 (contributions to collective works).
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“superintended” the work.340 In a casual multiparty conversation
among friends, it is implausible that the streamer would emerge as
the single “master mind” behind the entire sound recording.
Finally, the sound recorded during gameplay streams is often intertwined with the sound emanating from the video game being
played. The rights to the recorded sounds of a video game rest with
the game’s rightsholders—typically, the publishing studio. And in
cases where the sound from the game is intermixed with the recording of the streamer’s voice, the resultant recording may constitute
an unauthorized—and potentially unprotected—derivative work.
In short, there are a number of meaningful obstacles to copyright
protection of sound recordings in gameplay streams . Recordings of
streamer voiceovers often encompass spontaneous conversations or
oral statements that might not qualify as copyrightable works. In addition, these sound recordings often result from a conversation between multiple potential authors. They thus implicate limited, fragmented ownership interests. And the voiceover recording might be
inseparable from the video game’s sound. As a result, the streamer
would be ill-positioned to assert copyright ownership over her recordings.
Apart from the overlay and sound recording embedded in the
gameplay stream, streamers could attempt to claim ownership over
the actual gameplay footage. But the copyrightability of the gameplay video itself is contestable. The main problem is that it’s unclear
whether the streamer is the actual author of the footage. In the language of copyright law, the streamer appears to be merely “performing” the underlying video game. Is gameplay performance a copyrightable contribution?
This point warrants some parsing. One might argue that simply
playing a video game does not suffice to generate anything expressive enough to qualify for copyright protection. This is because
streamers seem to simply engage with someone else’s work, rather
than create an expressive work of their own. Further, the idea that a
performance constitutes a copyrightable work appears to rest on a
340

Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (holding that the “master mind” of the work is its
sole creator—the one who conceives, directs, and executes the idea, thus superintending
the work as a whole).
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category mistake. The Copyright Act does not treat a performance
as a type of “work.”341 Rather, a performance is a type of action
through which one might create or exploit a work of authorship.342
On this view, although the streamer is performing the relevant work,
that performance does not give rise to a standalone “work.” It is instead an exploitation of someone else’s work.
Relatedly, some courts have questioned whether video game
performance could be copyrightable. In one early case, the Seventh
Circuit mused that “[p]laying a video game is more like changing
channels on a television than it is like writing a novel or painting a
picture.”343 In this telling, because the player is faced with a finite
menu of pre-defined game sequences, she cannot be the author of
any creative work that might result from her gameplay.344 And while
a number of subsequent cases seem to hint at the possibility that
player contributions could be classified as (copyrightable) derivative works, these cases largely focus on the status of modifications
or add-ons generated by players.345 It is a separate question whether
gameplay performance alone, without in-game modification, can result in a protected contribution.
Nevertheless, some courts have recognized that performances
evincing a minimum quantum of creativity could trigger copyright

341

17 U.S.C. § 101 (to perform a work is “to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either
directly or by means of any device or process”).
342
See Brief for Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th
Cir. 2015).
343
See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1982).
344
Id. Another case pointing in the same direction is Williams Electronics v. Artic Int’l
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). There, the Third Circuit dismissed the defendants’ argument
that creative gameplay could render the player a “co-author of what appears on the screen.”
Id. at 874. Instead, the court emphasized that, “[a]lthough there is player interaction with
the machine during the play mode,” the game relies on a “repetitive sequence […] and
many aspects of the display remain constant from game to game regardless of how the
player operates the controls.” Id. See also Dan L. Burk, Electronic Gaming and the Ethics
of Information Ownership, 4 INT'L REV. INFO. ETHICS 39, 42 (2005) (pointing out that “the
law has been slow to recognize the contributions of participants in [gaming scenaria]”);
Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1545–46 (2013).
345
See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
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protection.346 In particular, courts have occasionally taken the position that sports performances—that is, movements by professional
athletes—meet the threshold for copyrightable subject matter.347
Performances of video games, the argument goes, may therefore
prove sufficiently creative for the purpose of copyright protection.
And, indeed, the idea that gameplay performance is copyrightable
has recently found favor with a number of commentators.348
Still, a mounting wave of critical commentary has pushed back
against the view that unscripted performances constitute expressive
works of authorship under copyright law, even when sufficiently
original.349 It thus remains unclear whether streamers hold any rights
346

Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1
(2019) (concluding that dramatic performances by actors are protected under American
copyright law).
347
Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 1986). The
Seventh Circuit suggested, in a lengthy footnote, that players’ performances—that is, their
movements while playing the game—were original enough to trigger copyright protection
once fixed. Id. at 669, n.7. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12.1,
at 2-142 (3d ed. 2018). Goldstein opines that “movements of players on the field, if
original, constitute copyrightable expression.” Id.
348
Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 959 (2012); W. Joss Nichols, Painting Through Pixels: The Case
for a Copyright in Videogame Play, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101 (2007).
349
Playing a game—either a sports game or a video game—does not necessarily give rise
to a protected “work” in the sense captured by modern copyright law. The question here is
whether the performer is creating a protected expression. Are such performances
expressive in the sense recognized by copyright law? Some courts have declined to extend
protection to sports performances on the grounds that these performances do not qualify as
expressive subject matter. See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that basketball games do not reflect “original works of authorship” under the 1976
Copyright Act). But this approach is vulnerable to criticism; after all, copyright law already
protects different categories of unscripted performances that could be described as nonexpressive in the sense referenced above. The law extends to the unscripted movements
and postures of a dancer—although one can similarly call into question the expressive
nature of a choreographic performance. To be sure, part of the problem is that performance
is not recognized as an independent category of protectable subject matter. David Nimmer
posits that performance should only be recognized as “an element of works potentially
subject to copyright protection, but not as a stand-alone category that itself deserves
recognition.” DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12(B)(3), at 2-178 (2018). Do
gameplay performances actually reflect the type of expressive endeavor meant to be
protected under copyright—and, if so, can they be protected under an independent,
standalone category of copyrightable subject matter? A full exploration of these questions
is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thoughtful discussion of similar concerns in the
context of dramatic performances by actors, see Hughes, supra note 346, at 3.
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to their performance of video games, not least because courts have
not yet recognized gameplay as copyrightable subject matter.
To further complicate matters, even if the gameplay performance is itself copyrightable, the resulting stream may constitute an
unlawful derivative work.350 The streamer does not own the rights
to the underlying work; the publishing studio does. In other words,
the underlying video game remains the property of the publishing
studio. Whether the stream in question is an unauthorized derivative
work depends on the terms of service that govern the underlying
video game. Some developers explicitly disallow streaming.351 Others permit only non-commercial streaming.352 And some developers
allow players to stream only parts of the game,353 while others seem
to have no policy in place at all.354 In many cases, then, the resulting
stream would amount to an illegal derivative work. And, because
gameplay streams are (potentially unauthorized) derivative works,
streamers may be precluded from asserting copyright in their
streams.
To conclude, copyright law appears to provide some measure of
legal protection, though potentially contested, to gameplay streamers. But despite the availability of these legal tools, streamers rarely
350

17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully.”). Although some courts
351
See End User Licensing Agreement for Doom Eternal, BETHESDA,
https://bethesda.net/en/eulas/doom-eternal [https://perma.cc/99J6-WCCG]. Section 3.4
(titled Limitations and Restrictions) bars users from publicly displaying or performing any
part of the game.
352
Fortnite’s terms of service are instructive. See Fan Content Policy, EPIC GAMES,
https://www.epicgames.com/site/en-US/fan-art-policy
[https://perma.cc/EG77-FARD]
(“Fan Content must have no commercial (i.e., monetary) objective. As an exception to this,
fans are permitted to monetize web videos (such as YouTube) with advertisements.”).
If enforced, this policy would outlaw Twitch streaming almost entirely: streamers on
Twitch rely not only on ads, but also on subscription fees and channel donations.
353
Megan Farokhmanesh, Persona 5 Developers Updated Their Streaming Guidelines,
But Didn’t Fix the Big Problem, THE VERGE (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/27/15442580/persona-5-streaming-atlus-screenshotssocial [https://perma.cc/4H7Y-6RLU].
354
For example, the publishing studio Bungie, which develops the popular game Halo,
appears to generally approve of streaming so long as donations or monetary support are
not sought. See Help: Intellectual Property and Trademarks, BUNGIE (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.bungie.net/en/Help/Article/45842 [https://perma.cc/UGG2-AZ6M].
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pursue litigation. What could explain the reluctance of streamers to
avail themselves of copyright law?
Several reasons come to mind. First, litigation is costly.355 In the
age of fast-paced digital consumption, it’s practically impossible to
police every single incident of norm violation. Second, community
members likely have a limited understanding of copyright law, as
do most laypeople.356 So while streamers seem to command a reasonable understanding of the technical process for submitting
takedown notices, this surely does not mean they understand the intricacies of the law. Third, as explained above, gameplay streams
are protected to a limited extent—primarily with respect to their accompanying elements, such as the streamer’s voiceover and the surrounding overlay. Putative infringers can thus avoid liability by editing out these protected elements. One way to do so, as I noted, is
to extract gameplay recordings directly from the game’s servers.
Fourth, and most importantly, streamers need not resort to litigation. They can instead enforce their rights through the DMCA notice-and-takedown system. This system enables streamers to swiftly
remove unauthorized contents. And while the DMCA provides
some (faint) safeguards against misuse—including a counter-notice
procedure357—streamers rarely face any meaningful resistance from
alleged infringers. This is because infringers are ill-informed about
the law and, crucially, because they might also subscribe to community norms regarding stream ownership. It’s likely that norm infringers assume, like other community members, that streamers own their
streams and are acting well within their rights in issuing takedown
notices.
Indeed, while streamers often submit takedown notices to ward
against unauthorized copying of their gameplay streams, they frequently fail to identify what elements of their streams are in fact
355

AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 44 (2017)
(reporting that the average cost of copyright litigation ranges from $200,000 to $1
million). See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277, 2277–80 (2013) (noting that “[l]itigating a copyright claim is
no longer an affordable prospect”).
356
Gregory N. Mandel, What Is IP For? Experiments in Lay and Expert Perceptions,
90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 659, 667–69 (2016).
357
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(g)(2), 512(g)(3).

2021]

FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES

769

protected under copyright law. This points to a broader issue, one
that is persistent but largely endemic to copyright law—the difficulty of distinguishing protected from nonprotected elements.358
5. Explaining Anti-Appropriation
The anti-appropriation norm crystalized in this subpart is driven
primarily by an idea of labor. Streamers believe that rights to their
video streams result from the labor they poured into creating these
streams. Doug Martin, famous Call of Duty streamer, has recently
recalled:
[The] biggest difference between YouTube and
streaming is that [ . . . ] streaming is more hours;
streaming is easier but it’s more time-consuming.
You have to be very strict with your schedule. You
have to be streaming every single day, 5-6-7 hours a
day, whereas [on] YouTube, some of your best videos can literally take you 30 minutes [to make], and
they can get a [lot] of views, and you don’t have to
do anything for the rest of the day.359
As this excerpt makes clear, streaming is hard work. Narrowly
understood, work means time—and streaming is particularly timeconsuming. The most popular streamer in the world, Richard
Blevins, spent no less than 3,800 hours streaming Fortnite in
2018.360 These figures are staggering: they translate, roughly, to 11
hours of streaming per day, including weekends. This is why many

358

Christopher J. Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, The Filtration Problem in
Copyright’s “Substantial Similarity” Infringement Test, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 571,
579 (2019) (arguing that substantive similarity tests under U.S. law are ill-suited to
distinguish protected from nonprotected elements).
359
See Faze Censor, Quitting YouTube?, YOUTUBE (May 22, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OrXWEoQJKx8&t=173s [https://perma.cc/K3HL2LUV] (starting at 2:05).
360
James Loke Hale, Ninja’s Spent 3,800 Hours Streaming ‘Fortnite’ This Year. That’s
the Equivalent of 95 40-Hour Workweeks, TUBE FILTER (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.tubefilter.com/2018/12/04/ninja-how-many-hours-streaming-twitch-earnings
[https://perma.cc/YG6G-HGDR].
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streamers advocate a minimum of four hours of streaming a day.361
The assumption here is that, in essence, Twitch viewership picks up
momentum over time. Extended streaming is therefore a necessity
under Twitch’s viewership system. And the consequences can be
dire. One streamer, for instance, penned a scathing jeremiad observing that the long hours of streaming had nearly cost him his life.362
As he put it, “[y]ou need[] to spend a minimum of eight hours a day,
at least six days a week, to get anywhere.”363 His streaming schedule, he said, was so demanding that he could barely spare time to do
anything save for streaming and eating.364
In brief, streaming involves exceptionally long hours. And while
streamers typically stream from the comfort of their homes, they are
nonetheless shackled to a ruthless work schedule that requires long
work hours and incredible day-to-day consistency.
But for streamers, gameplay streaming involves more than just
long hours; it also turns on expertise and skill. Fighting games offer
a good example. These games are remarkably complex, and players
spend thousands of hours studying these games in a scientific-like
fashion, memorizing the frame data of each game. Building on the
game’s under-the-hood mechanics, players resourcefully craft creative strategies that allow them to specialize in playing particular
characters and effectively countering other characters.365
A brief primer on frame data might prove useful. A frame is the
basic unit of time in a video game; a still frame of graphics is displayed every 1/60th of a second.366 Thus, if a particular in-game
361

Harry Lyles, Jr., Twitch Streaming Is a Job That’s Harder than It Looks. Here’s How
Gamers Stay Balanced, SB NATION (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.sbnation.com/
2019/10/8/20897184/twitch-streamers-gamers-self-care [https://perma.cc/XC9W-7JBG]
(“Most streamers are live for anywhere between four and 10 [sic] hours a day (sometimes
longer!)….”).
362
Joe Marino, Trying to ‘Make It’ as a Twitch Streamer Almost Killed Me, KOTAKU
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.kotaku.com.au/2017/02/trying-to-make-it-as-a-twitchstreamer-almost-killed-me/ [https://perma.cc/N7T8-K73Y].
363
Id.
364
Id.
365
Id.
366
David Sirlin, A Fighting Game First: Showing Frame Advantage, SIRLIN ON GAME
DESIGN (Oct. 4, 2018), http://www.sirlin.net/posts/a-fighting-game-first-showing-frame-
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move launches within 4 frames, it starts in 4/60ths of a second. Each
character in a fighting game is typically equipped with 15 to 30
moves. Every move is broken down into numerous different frame
data points, reflecting the various phases of the move (e.g., startup,
recovery, etc.).367 Faster moves—that is, moves whose execution involves fewer frames—are advantageous. A five-frame kick move,
for example, is superior to a seven-frame kick move, because the
former is faster.
Analyzing the full roster of characters featured in the game,
players must memorize hundreds, even thousands, of minute data
points. They study the frame data underlying thousands of different
in-game moves. Indeed, players pour a great deal of talent, ambition,
and creativity into these games. To hone their skills, gamers must
forge an understanding of the ways in which the game can and
should be played. As one streamer pithily explained, “I put 2437
hours on [the video game]…This is my life.”368 The streamer further
noted that he deserves recognition because this is “something [he
had] worked for.”369 Some video games require thousands of hours
to learn and truly master. In assessing the effort that goes into
streaming, players routinely factor in the time spent studying the
game. Their conception of labor thus applies to the hours spent
streaming as well as the time spent mastering the game.
Moreover, aside from the raw effort associated with streaming
and studying the game, streamers also believe they deserve rewards
for the way in which they uniquely execute their vision of the game.
One streamer observed:
I feel like playing video games at the highest professional level is an art in and out of itself. You have to
advantage [https://perma.cc/ZG87-4G9Y]; Wesley Yin-Poole, For the First Time, a
Fighting Game Has Turned Frame Advantage into a Visual Effect, EUROGAMER (Oct. 5,
2018), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-10-05-for-the-first-time-a-fighting-game
-has-turned-frame-advantage-into-a-visual-effect [https://perma.cc/ST9X-Y77K].
367
Sirlin, supra note 366.
368
Tommy Tweedy (@TweedyIN), TWITTER (Feb. 18, 2019, 12:22 PM),
https://twitter.com/TweedyIN/status/1097546925178540032
[https://perma.cc/SS7CTFW8].
369
Tommy Tweedy (@TweedyIN), TWITTER (Feb. 18, 2019, 12:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/TweedyIN/status/1097546775722975232
[https://perma.cc/95RT6MHB].
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put your own creativity, mindset, and uniqueness
into whatever character/environment that [you’re] in,
and nobody else can play the way you can!370
The idea here is that players do more than simply execute game
commands in a technical fashion. Instead, they engage in a creative
enterprise that reflects both their talent and creative vision. While
video games are built on software code, and while the range of available in-game options is technically finite, no two high-level gamers
play alike. Each develops her own unique style based on her understanding of the way in which the game should be played from a creative vantage point.
Accordingly, streamers have a threefold understanding of labor.
Depending on the context, labor is associated with (1) the time spent
streaming the game; (2) the time required to study the game and acquire expertise; and (3) the value that results from one’s execution
of her creative vision of the game. This involuted understanding of
labor animates streamers’ idea of ownership. As one streamer noted,
he simply deserves the recognition he “[has] worked for.”371 And
this understanding is not limited to streamers alone. Community
members overwhelmingly endorse similar ideas based on the notion
that streamers work hard to produce “content,” and thus merit a
measure of protection over the intangible assets they had created.
This tune will sound strikingly familiar to those versed in copyright theory—it brings to mind the Lockean labor theory, which
holds that people deserve to own goods that they had created through
productive labor.372 In Part IV.B. below, I revisit the labor theory
and explain why, as the gaming case study shows, this theory is
poorly tailored to inform copyright law.
D. Taking Stock
This Part elaborated at length on the concept of fairness in the
gaming world. It sorted out three norms of fairness that dominate
370

Dominique McLean (@SonicFox), TWITTER (Apr. 23, 2019, 9:40 PM),
https://twitter.com/SonicFox/status/1120864944705220608
[https://perma.cc/68TAKE9T].
371
See supra note 362.
372
See infra Section I.B.
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the video game industry. First, I showed that players largely eschew
in-game microtransactions to the extent that they provide competitive, rather than cosmetic, enhancements. Second, I explained that
the secret sauce to Fortnite’s success is partly rooted in the concept
of wealth sharing: gamers are positively inclined to support freemium games because they view these games as facilitating wealth
sharing on the part of game creators. Third, I explored gameplay
streaming through the lens of the labor theory, suggesting that players guard against perceived misappropriations of their streams given
the amount of labor—time, effort, skill, and vision—that they put
into producing these streams.
IV.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The preceding analysis identified a complex mosaic of fairness
norms in the gaming community. I now draw on this descriptive account in mounting a normative case against strong IP protections. I
argue that norms of fairness can produce insights relevant to the justificatory framework of copyright law. More specifically, these
norms can minimize the risks associated with content production,
and thus undermine the need for strong copyright protection. I similarly cast doubt over the veracity of the labor theory: I show that
the concept of intellectual “labor” is tied to a number of different
ideas in the gaming community. These ideas vary by context and fail
to provide a compelling justification for IP law.
A. Revisiting Copyright Incentives
The prevailing justification for copyright law is utilitarian. On
this account, copyright law is concerned with striking a balance between two conflicting interests: the interest in providing incentives
to creators on the one hand, and the interest in ensuring that intellectual works are ultimately disseminated to the public on the
other.373 This account turns on the observation that intellectual
373

For an overview of the economic approach to copyright law, see Wendy J. Gordon &
Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 189
(Boudewijn, Bouckaert, & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J.
Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON.
PERS. 3, 11–18 (1991).
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creations are both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, thus resembling
public goods.374 As a result, absent exclusive rights, creators
wouldn’t be able to prevent others from making cheap copies of their
works and undercutting their profits.375 And if the creator cannot recoup the costs of her initial investment, she would presumably
choose not to create at all. Copyright law attends to this market failure by providing authors with time-limited, exclusive entitlements
in their creations. This scheme is thought to cohere with the promise
of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, namely to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”376
At the same time, “the goal of intellectual property law is only
to provide the ‘optimal incentive,’ not the largest incentive possible.”377 Copyright exacts a heavy toll: it allows creators to charge
supracompetitive prices, thereby pricing some consumers out of the
market. But the costs associated with a heavy-handed copyright regime run deeper. By denying access to some consumers, copyright
risks hampering the spread of knowledge and impeding the creation
of new works. The process of creation is often referential or cumulative.378 Authors work within a certain genre or field and draw inspiration from previous work in that field. It’s often the case, then,
that authors build on preexisting works in creating new ones.379 And
because copyright law limits access to existing works, it may impair
the ability of future authors to produce new works. For this reason,

374

David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533, 533 (2011).
375
See Paula Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy, 1
U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 3–4 (2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 (2003) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts’Arts.’” (quoting Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))).
376
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
377
Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 125 (1999).
378
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997) (“[K]nowledge is cumulative—authors and inventors must
necessarily build on what came before them.”).
379
Id.
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copyright law purports to provide creators with limited incentives
that would encourage creativity while at once facilitating the dissemination of “information for the public benefit.”380
U.S. copyright law is largely premised on this utilitarian approach.381 But commentators widely agree that the underlying balance between incentives and access is misaligned. Copyright law,
many believe, is too protective of copyright holders. And the law
consequently fails to safeguard the interests of consumers and subsequent authors in accessing protected works. For decades, scholars
have advanced arguments to this effect.382 Pamela Samuelson, for
380

Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information
Marketplace, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 851 (2001).
381
See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
433, 433 (2007) (noting that “[n]othing is more fundamental to copyright law than the
concept of incentives”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–77 (2009) (“[C]opyright law in the United
States has undeniably come to be understood almost entirely in utilitarian, incentive-driven
terms.”); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513, 524 (1999) (“The fundamental premise of our copyright
law is that the best way to encourage the creation of valuable works is to let authors capture
the market value of those works.”). See generally Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (recognizing that “[b]y establishing a marketable right
to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas”); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797
(2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197,
1203 (1996); Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mills
Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 187 (1985); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)
(“The economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause]…is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors….”); Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[C]opyright law celebrates the profit
motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will
redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.…The profit
motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”).
382
See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX (2008); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX
(2008); Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly, 25 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS
71 (2001); Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Created a
New Exclusive Right of Access? Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users’ and
Content Providers’ Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 277 (2001); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User Right Approach, in EXCEPTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS 132 (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement
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example, famously argued that the law has trended toward a “maximalist” construction of copyright.383 Modern copyright law is more
robust and sweeping than ever before: copyright owners possess
more rights, these rights are interpreted broadly, and they last
longer.384 The needle has moved decidedly toward copyright owners
and away from users. And though this trend is not entirely unidirectional,385 the overall picture is at best contestable. Is this expansive
vision of copyright law desirable from a policy perspective? On a
utilitarian account, IP can only be justified to the extent that it produces a net positive effect. This doesn’t mean that we’d necessarily
be better off with no IP, but it should at least give us pause. And it
should provoke a measured reflection on the merits of IP across a
wide range of creative industries.
While the evidence is incomplete, the limited glossary presented
in Part II can offer a few clues. It shows that numerous creative industries have been doing just fine without formal IP—communities
of French chefs, comedians, drag queens, and even fashion designers386 have managed to sustain relatively high levels of innovation
despite the absence of formal IP. These studies appear to support the
proposition that the law should be limited in scope: we simply don’t
need to shoulder the burden associated with a heavy-handed IP regime where it is unnecessary.
Along the same lines, this Article cautions against strong IP. It
suggests that strong IP may be undesirable in communities where
and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Richard
A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 123 (2002).
383
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED (Jan. 1, 1996),
https://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-paper/ [https://perma.cc/K3WY-RVTX].
384
See generally supra note 382.
385
Most prominently, courts have relied on the fair use doctrine to facilitate public access
to protected works. An instructive example is the Google Books Project. Google sought to
create a universal body of human knowledge by scanning, indexing, and storing millions
of books. The Authors’ Guild brought action for copyright infringement, and Google
countered that the scanning of these books—a large majority of which were not in the
public domain—amounts to fair use. After a legal dispute that spanned nearly eight years,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York sided with Google, holding that
its use of the books was fair. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
386
See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 19.
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fairness norms are prevalent. Specifically, fairness can reduce the
risks that innovators face. Innovation is linked to two principal risks:
the risk of commercial failure and the risk of commercial success.387
If the copyrighted work proves commercially unviable—say, if consumers simply do not want to purchase the author’s book or engage
with it—then no amount of IP protection could salvage it. By contrast, if the work fares well in the market, the author faces a different
potential risk: she might have to rely on IP to prevent competitors
from copying the work and infusing the market with cheap copies.
Subsequent copies are often costless and easy to mass-produce. The
author might spend two years writing a book, but, once released,
copies of the book can be made and digitally distributed at virtually
no cost. The author would then be unable to recoup the costs of writing the book. IP protection may thus be necessary to ensure a return
on the author’s initial investment.
Norms of fairness, this Article suggests, can address both risks
at once. First, fairness can reduce the risk of commercial failure. It
can diminish the risks surrounding content production so long as
consumers regard as “fair” the content provider’s business model.
Freemium games present a striking example. To the extent that content providers steer clear from competitive enhancements, microtransactions can work wonders to boost profits.388 Freemium games
can also give rise to communities of dedicated fans. One commentator has made a similar argument in the context of jambands,389 and
this Article extends and applies these insights to the massive gaming
industry. In particular, it contends that ideas of wealth sharing can
be conducive to sustaining communities of devoted fans, thus minimizing the risk of consumer defection to potential market competitors. Fairness, in short, is a markedly powerful tool, and content

387

Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital
Disruption: Streaming & the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555,
1604 (2019) (explaining that authors face two main risks: “[T]he risk of failure. This is the
risk that no one wants to read, watch, or listen to the work that the author creates…[and]
the risk of success. This is the risk that a work in fact proves to be popular, and that
popularity attracts pirates whose unauthorized copies steal away potential customers….”).
388
See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
389
See generally Schultz, supra note 16; see also supra text accompanying notes 259–
262.
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providers would be well-served by embracing principles of fairness
in their business dealings.
In addition, fairness norms hold the promise of addressing the
second principal risk that creators face: the risk of commercial success, i.e. that the product would be copied by competitors or consumers. This Article shows that microtransactions, executed correctly, can largely cancel out the risk of piracy. This is because,
simply put, there’s nothing left to copy. The game itself is freely
available. When the content is offered at zero cost, consumers have
little incentive to pirate.
Of course, free-to-pay games also offer premium in-game purchases; primarily, cosmetic enhancements released on a periodic basis. But these enhancements are hard to copy. First, copying in-game
designs requires expertise, time, and resources. As opposed to filesharing in the music industry, copying in-game digital goods would
require, in effect, using software code to manipulate the game’s underlying executing code. Second, and most importantly, copying ingame designs is impractical. Cosmetic in-game designs are hot commodities the minute they are released, but rapidly decrease in value.
In many freemium games, such as Fortnite, in-game designs are released weekly. Players rush to purchase designs shortly after release:
they want their characters to don the latest-and-greatest design, but
are likely to lose interest as soon as a new design comes out. By the
time copiers might get around to copying the latest in-game design,
that design may no longer be in demand. Because in-game designs
are held out as popular for only a fleeting moment, copying is unlikely to flourish.390 The value of in-game designs stems from their
390

The rationale for this, as explained above, is simple: copying is not always easy. This
is especially true in the context of video games, where copying in-game digital goods
requires a great deal of expertise, resources and, most importantly, time. But time is in
short supply when in-game designs go out of style, so to speak, in a matter of days. Under
these time constraints, piracy is unlikely to present much of a threat. Interestingly, in-game
designs seem to differ from the cyclical pattern that engulfs fashion designs. Copying in
the fashion industry is rampant, but some argue that piracy supports (rather than arrests)
innovation in designs. This is because copying helps to cement fashion “trends.” In turn,
trends communicate to consumers what designs are presently en vogue and thus drive
increased consumption. However, at some point, there’s simply too much copying—the
trend becomes overused, and consumers move on to the next trend (facilitated by
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relative novelty and timely popularity. As a result, they are rarely
the subject of widespread copying. This business structure is driven
by fairness: for microtransactions to function properly, and for consumers to remain engaged with the game over time, consumers have
to regard the game as fair as a matter of competitive integrity and
wealth sharing.
Further, in the video game industry, copyright law is rarely used
to guard against consumer piracy. In a free-to-play world driven by
fairness, the threat of piracy is insubstantial. Instead, game developers invoke IP law to enforce norms of competitive integrity; namely,
to prevent players from using various “hacks” or “cheats” to gain an
unfair in-game advantage. In one recent high-profile case, the developers of Fortnite brought legal action against a fourteen-year-old
boy accused of selling “cheats” for the game.391 The complaint alleged that the defendant infringed the developers’ rights by “inject[ing] unauthorized computer code into [the plaintiffs’] copyright
protected Fortnite code to allow its users to cheat.”392 To be sure,
players care profoundly about perceptions of competitive integrity.
And developers, ever attuned to these perceptions, seem increasingly poised to enforce ideas of competitive integrity.
The legal landscape has therefore shifted. Rightsholders wield
copyright law not as a means of preventing copying, but rather as a
mechanism for promoting perceptions of fairness. Still, game developers have alternative means of enforcement—they can rely on contractual tools to ban players or revoke their accounts when they use
“bots” or “hacks” to cheat their way into obtaining an in-game advantage.393 So while the use of IP tools may send a strong message,
it’s not strictly necessary. And, more importantly, that is not what
copyright law is about. The law is fundamentally about incentives.
It provides creators with time-limited market exclusivity in order to

widespread copying of the new, latest-and-greatest design). See generally Raustiala &
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 19.
391
Corinne Reichert, Epic Games Settles with 14-Year-Old Over Selling Fortnite Cheats,
CNET (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/epic-settles-with-14-year-old-overselling-fortnite-cheats/ [https://perma.cc/A3QF-D3XE].
392
Complaint at 3, Epic Games, Inc. v. C.B., No. 5:19-cv-250, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
167416 (E.D.N.C. June 18, 2019).
393
See sources cited in supra note 56.
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incentivize innovation. But if no such incentives are necessary, and
if competitive integrity can be enforced via non-IP means, then IP
law may be at least partly superfluous.
Business strategy has also been key to combating piracy and mitigating production risks in other industries. A prime example is the
music industry. For decades, music was predominantly consumed
through the sale and purchase of physical albums.394 The industry
then pivoted toward the “iTunes pricing model,” where consumers
could pay a modest fee to purchase a single song instead of an entire
album.395 And the music industry today is principally driven by digital streaming—large music aggregators (such as Spotify) provide
consumers with access to enormous libraries of music in return for
a monthly fee.396 This latest model has created an equilibrium in
which piracy is simply futile. Through a “clever combination of premium and paid services[,]”397 content providers have been able to
effectively counteract music piracy.
A recent study by Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala
meshes comfortably with these observations. Sprigman and Raustiala explore the emergence of data-driven creativity; that is, creative
content that is informed by the data that content creators collect
about consumers’ tastes and preferences.398 Netflix, for example,
curates data about the consumers who use its service. 399 It tracks
394

Christopher Sprigman, The 99 Cent Question, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 87,
90 (2006) (“In the not-so-long-ago world before downloads, songs were almost always
sold as part of a larger bundle—i.e., individual tracks were packaged with other songs on
an album, and marketed together in a variety of formats, including vinyl records, cassettes,
and, latterly, CDs.”).
395
Id.
396
See Tyler Laurence, “Wake Up, Mr. West!”: Distinguishing Albums and
Compilations for Statutory Damages in Copyright within a Streaming–Centric Music
Economy, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2018) (noting that the music industry
recently shifted to a “direct-to-consumer streaming model”).
397
See Jérôme Hergueux & Dariusz Jemielniak, Should Digital Files be Considered a
Commons? Copyright Infringement in the Eyes of Lawyers, 35 INFO. SOC’Y 198, 198
(2019). Spotify and other music streaming services have adapted to digital piracy by
building “a sustainable competitive advantage based on intuitive usability and an excellent
understanding of customers’ need.” Id.
398
See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 387, at 1594 (observing that “information about
consumer preferences…flows in to the distributor. When coupled to rapid advances in data
analysis techniques, this…becomes a very powerful tool for shaping content.”).
399
Id. at 1584–90.
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what consumers watch and for how long.400 Netflix can then draw
on these data in creating content that is best calibrated to satisfy the
specific tastes of consumers, thus reducing the risk of commercial
failure.401 Combined with an all-you-can-eat pricing model, where
consumers are offered access to a large catalogue of contents in exchange for a monthly fee, Netflix can extinguish or greatly reduce
both the risk of commercial failure and the risk of commercial success. Given the rise of data-driven creativity, Sprigman and Raustiala inveigh against strong IP protections. They conclude that, in a
world where creators can pin down consumer preferences while deploying pricing models that appeal to consumers across the board,
the scope of IP should be narrowed or at least recalibrated.402
In line with this model of data-driven creativity, this Article
chalks out a model of fairness-driven creativity—namely, a form of
content creation that is informed by, and responsive to, ideas of fairness. Consumers are more hospitable to business practices that correspond to ideas of wealth sharing and competitive integrity. When
perceptions of fairness hold, consumers may even assist content creators in detecting and policing pirated contents.403 At bottom, fairness gives rise to notions of reciprocity and loyalty. Fairness therefore fuels consumer dedication and reduces the risk of defection to
competitors, while at once lending legitimacy to the content provider’s pricing model.
Are these insights generalizable to other industries? Fairness is
a central feature of human interaction: people are meaningfully motivated, if only implicitly, by ideas of reciprocity and fairness. And
much of the research suggests that the juxtaposition of a smart pricing model (freemium games, Netflix, Spotify) with a fairness-inducing business strategy (no competitive enhancements in video games,
400

Id. at 1587–88.
Id. at 1587.
402
Id. at 1614 (noting that “[i]n this world, copyright protection is far less central,
because content is far less central,” hence concluding that “data-driven creativity pushes in
the direction of less copyright, and possibly substantially less”).
403
Mark Schultz’s study on the jamband community provides one example. It shows that
fans of jambands internalize the bands’ preferences as their own, and then police other
community members in enforcing these preferences. They do so specifically with respect
to the norm against unauthorized distribution of studio recordings. See generally Schultz,
supra note 16.
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limited enforcement of rights in jamband recordings) can yield effective results in different contexts.
Finally, a note on the scope of this Article. I do not mean to suggest that copyright is wholly redundant. Instead, my argument cuts
only against strong IP protections while recognizing that some (arguably modest) measure of IP remains necessary to combat wholesale copying by market competitors. For example, competitors
should not be allowed to make exact copies of the game Fortnite
and market them under a different title. In other words, some degree
of IP protection remains necessary to stave off literal copying by
market rivals (or new entrants) attempting to capitalize on the success of others’ content. And while consumer piracy is less likely to
thrive in a world that brims with data-driven or fairness-driven creativity, copying by market competitors remains a steady, though not
always significant, risk. The net result is that some degree of copyright protection would nevertheless be warranted.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to properly assess what
level of IP protection would be desirable in this new world. The most
trivial challenge is to recalibrate the length of the copyright term.
Today, copyrights typically last for 70 years after the death of the
author. That means that some works may be protected for well over
a century. But in practice, few works carry market value, and most
are only commercially viable for short periods of time.404 Indeed,
the law’s protective umbrella—extending a century into the future—
404

See, e.g., Kristelia García & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term,
71 ALA. L. REV. 351 (2019). García and McCrary analyze sales data in the music industry
to find that “the vast majority of copyrightable information goods never reach the point of
commercial viability.” Id. at 383. They also find that even for commercially successful
musical works, the drop-off in sales “is extraordinarily rapid, falling to one tenth of initial
levels well within a year.” Id. at 391. See also Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing
Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). Sprigman discusses the now-abolished
requirement that copyright holders renew their rights after a relatively short initial term by
reregistering their copyright. Sprigman finds that, at a time when authors had to renew their
rights to maintain them, many failed to do so. He points out that, historically,
approximately 15% of works were renewed, while 85% of works entered the public domain
after a relatively short term of protection. Id. at 519–21. This suggests that many works
were not commercially viable, explaining why owners would rather forgo their rights rather
than expend unnecessary resources to renew them. Sprigman therefore concludes that
“[t]he majority of creative works have little or no commercial value, and the value of many
initially successful works is quickly exhausted.” Id. at 489.
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seems fallaciously excessive and would likely need to be cabined
substantially.
Another potential reform might involve the scope of the reproduction right. The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce their work.405 The reproduction right sweeps
far and wide. It applies to both literal and nonliteral (partial) copying,406 and it covers both commercial and personal copying, though
the latter is more likely to qualify as fair use.407 Nonetheless, this
Article shows that game developers rarely use their rights to prevent
private copying by consumers. And while some scholars have called
for eliminating the reproduction right altogether,408 I suggest that we
might benefit from narrowing its scope. More to the point, we
should consider excluding cases of personal use—private copying
by consumers—from copyright’s reach, especially in circumstances
where widespread distribution of infringing copies is unlikely to follow. After all, private copying is a vanishingly small threat in a
world driven by fairness.
This Article advances a rather bold argument about the relationship between copyright law and norms of fairness. One possible objection is that this account of fairness leans too heavily on big-title
games like Fortnite. It thus papers over other, non-freemium games.
Different types of pricing schemes, unlike free-to-play games, actually depend on a strong copyright system. And so my proposal,
which seeks to scale back the scope of copyright law, would deliver
a death blow to much of the video game industry; it would privilege
free-to-play games at the expense of every other pricing scheme. Or
so the argument goes.
But this objection is misguided, for two reasons. First, the existence of multiple business models—some of which are supported by
strong copyright protections—is not an unalloyed blessing. As this
405
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discussion makes clear, copyright law has a price. It limits access to
copyrighted works and can effectively frustrate future creativity. So
as we think about the scope of copyright law, we should consider
the benefits and costs of a multifaceted industry. Second, it is important to reiterate that I am not suggesting we eliminate copyright
law. Rather, I argue that we should adjust the law to better address
the realities of modern content industries.
Another possible objection is that my analysis fails to properly
confront anticompetitive concerns. Games like Fortnite have built a
massive fan base and the developers behind these games exploit
norms of fairness to sustain and expand their consumer base. A recent study similarly finds that the video game industry, like other
content industries, is trending toward market concentration.409 It is
certainly true that norms of fairness play a role in facilitating these
shifts. That said, it is also true that IP law is poorly equipped to address anticompetitive concerns. In fact, rightsholders have often
weaponized IP law to achieve the opposite end—to stunt competition by preventing market entrants from challenging incumbents.410
And while I am sympathetic to competitive concerns, an analysis of
how we might best tackle them is beyond the purview of this project.
B. Decoding Labor
Although copyright law is thought to rest on utilitarian grounds,
some commentators view IP through the lens of a “natural rights”
framework, building on John Locke’s theory of property.411 They
suggest that intellectual property rights constitute a deserved reward
for the labor expended in creating a work: by laboring upon otherwise commonly held assets, creators acquire natural rights to these
assets.412 This theory, particularly pervasive in continental Europe,
draws from the premise that people are entitled to the fruits of their
409
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labor. Still other observers, inspired by the writings of Hegel and
Kant, contend that the author’s personality is reflected in—and so
constituted by—her creation. On this account, works of authorship
mirror their authors’ ongoing personality interests and justify their
rights in such works.413
Some critics argue that moral rights theories advance an expansive vision of intellectual property, potentially resulting in a more
robust grant of rights.414 This is because the moral rights framework
seems to eschew the utilitarian concern for striking a careful balance
between incentives and access. And while this expansive view of
natural rights is somewhat simplistic,415 it nonetheless animates concerns over the application of moral rights theories. Critics worry that
an embrace of moral rights would result in an imbalanced IP regime
that predominantly privileges rightsholders at the expense of users
and society at large. Perhaps more damning is Mark Lemley’s objection that those who support IP on moral grounds are engaging in
a faith-like practice, insulated from facts or reason.416 The law, Lemley observes, is neither informed by nor comports with a moral
413
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vision of IP.417 Lemley is primarily troubled by the prospect that
champions of natural rights would support a maximalist vision of
intellectual property even where the empirical evidence clearly
shows that intellectual property fails to promote, and might even stifle, innovation.418
Despite these concerns, moral intuitions shape the way people
think about intellectual property. Jeanne Fromer adduces evidence
showing that creators are motivated by a concern for labor and personhood.419 In a similar vein, some studies find that authors bring
infringement suits because they believe their moral, rather than economic, interests have been compromised.420 Similarly, a recent
study by Stephanie Plamondon Bair bears witness to the utility of
fairness as a vehicle for spurring innovation.421 She presents evidence showing that (i) perceptions of fairness in the workplace trigger enhanced creativity; (ii) fairness leads to more creative results
or products; and (iii) ideas of fairness accord with the way people
think about copyright law.422 Moreover, although courts remain reluctant to expressly invoke moral theories of IP,423 these theories
sometimes drive their decisions.424
417
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The evidence suggests that fairness—in particular, labor—
looms large in people’s conception of IP. This Article corroborates
these insights. It shows that perceptions of fairness are robust and
omnipresent in the world’s largest content industry. It finds that creators often deploy community norms to vindicate their labor interests. And they devise creative ways to promote notions of fairness
without resort to legal action. But more fundamentally, I suggest that
labor theories, despite their pervasiveness in various creative spaces,
are ill-suited to inform legal rules.
In exploring this labor-driven conception of fairness, I build on
William Fisher’s sophisticated exposition of the labor theory.425 In
his influential essay on theories of intellectual property, Fisher recounts some of the challenges that have long dogged the labor theory, focusing on the question of what actually qualifies as intellectual labor.426 As Fisher points out, labor can implicate four different
concepts. First, labor can mean time and effort—the hours spent creating the work, or the physical and mental effort associated with
producing intellectual goods. Second, labor can be understood as referring to an undesirable activity, namely, one “in which [a person]
would rather not engage.”427 Third, labor can be viewed through the
prism of its resultant value—the social benefits it confers upon society (think, for example, of valuable inventions in the realm of patents). Fourth, labor can refer to creative activities that yield new
ideas.
These conceptions of labor bear a striking resemblance to the
way streamers think about their gameplay streams. The picture
sketched above shows that, for streamers, labor embodies at least
three different concepts: (1) the time spent streaming or playing the
game; (2) the time spent acquiring expertise and studying the game;

that appears as free-riding should be illegal, even though free-riding is not per se illegal.”);
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and (3) the value that results from one’s execution of her creative
vision of the game.428
Ideas (1) and (2) correspond to Fisher’s first definition, where
labor centers on time and effort. Streamers put time and effort into
streaming (and mastering the game), and therefore believe they are
entitled to claim ownership over their recorded streams. Idea (2) can
also align with Fisher’s second articulation of labor—the process of
acquiring expertise can amount to a laborious activity that is undesirable, surely in terms of scope: players spend thousands of hours
studying games, and view that process as necessary though taxing.
Idea (3) can plausibly attach to the last two variations on labor—
the notion that labor is linked to value, and the belief that labor is
associated with a creative, novel process. Indeed, video games are
about more than just a mechanical execution of in-game commands.
Players view their playing style as unique and creative. They believe
that one’s playing style reflects her creative voice. For them, labor
implicates one’s novel, creative vision. And players are often credited with generating value, say, by fleshing out a character; that is,
by crafting a particular playing style that utilizes a certain in-game
character in a creative, unique way. The upshot is that creative players can forge a path forward, showing other players how the game
can and should be played.
In sum, streamers’ ever-shifting conception of labor conforms
neatly to the different notions of labor explored by Fisher. Streamers
view labor as an incident of time and effort. At times, they also believe labor is associated with an unpleasant activity. And, on other
occasions, they view labor through the lens of added value or creative novelty: for streamers, labor might therefore refer to the
streamer’s creative vision or innovative in-game strategy.
The choice among the different conceptions of labor has practical implications. Our conception of labor determines if, and to what
extent, the labor theory can in fact justify or ground copyright law.
If one insists that labor is reducible to value or meaningful utility,
much of copyright law seems out of place. This is because the law’s
bar for originality is fairly modest: qualifying works need not
428
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provide any distinct social benefits. Similarly, if one takes the position that labor boils down to time and effort, copyright law remains
a poor fit. Although authors often put some minimal amount of effort into their creations, no amount of labor is required to qualify for
legal protection. The sweat-of-the-brow doctrine, which required a
showing of effort as a condition for copyright protection, was jettisoned by the Supreme Court in Feist.429
Moreover, if professional streamers actually like their work—if
they enjoy playing video games—one would be hard-pressed to justify the grant of rights in gaming streams under the second interpretation of labor, i.e., the idea that labor refers to an undesirable activity. Finally, if one accepts the fourth construction of labor, it is similarly hard to justify copyright law. The law requires only a modest
amount of creativity. It does not demand that qualifying works be
novel in any serious sense. Indeed, one might question whether, and
to what extent, the streamers’ work spawns something truly novel in
the traditional sense. After all, streamers are essentially engaging
with someone else’s work (the underlying video game), and do not
seem to be creating anything new from the vantage point of copyright law.
The type of labor at stake is therefore central to our assessment
of the theory. But the amount of labor is also crucial. This becomes
relevant when one tries to apply the labor theory to gameplay
streams against the backdrop of the labor performed by the creators
of the underlying video game. Robert Nozick was the first to identify
the difficulty of distilling a property right that would award the laborer a property interest proportional to her labor.430 Depending on
one’s idea of labor, streamers can be viewed as having expended
only a modest amount of labor. If we think of labor in terms of time
or effort, or in terms of an undesirable activity, it then follows that
streamers put only a trivial amount of labor into their streams. The
creators of the underlying video game have put, on balance, much
more time, effort, and resources into producing the game. Big video
games cost hundreds of millions of dollars to make, take years to
create, and involve a collaborative enterprise encompassing
429
430
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hundreds of developers, programmers, and designers. The amount
of labor that streamers put in, on the other hand, is proportionately
miniscule. Thus, if we take Locke’s theory of labor seriously, one
might struggle to justify property interests in gameplay streams.
In fact, it is equally difficult to justify rights in gameplay streams
even if one takes a more expansive view of streamers’ labor:
namely, if one accepts that streamers produce something creative
and socially valuable. How should the streamers’ subsequent contribution be measured in relation to the value or novelty of the underlying video game? In other words, even if we are willing to concede (as I am) that streamers generate goods of value, these goods
largely pale in comparison to the grandiose project undertaken by
the creators of the underlying game. Many video games are played
by hundreds of millions of players around the world and are the
products of massive collaborative projects that culminate in beautiful, complex audiovisual works. Gameplay streams, by comparison,
fare rather poorly. The value they generate is marginal relative to
the underlying video game on which they build. For these reasons,
the Lockean labor theory is of little use to those who seek to lay
claim to their gameplay streams.
The gaming case study illuminates the fraught foundations of the
labor theory. It does so by underscoring the difficulty of pinpointing
what labor actually means. Streamers invoke different conceptions
of labor in different contexts. This divergence, in turn, constricts our
understanding of what labor means and how it might justify the
grant of property rights in different cases. Similar concerns arise
when one attempts to calibrate the size of the reward given to the
laborer against the proportional value of her labor. When considered
in relation to the amount (qualitative or quantitative) of labor generated by the laborer, the Lockean theory fails to provide a strong justification for property rights in gameplay streams.
CONCLUSION
Bridging the divide between business strategy and copyright
law, this project joins the burgeoning literature on norms-based governance of intellectual property. And while previous research has
focused on discrete, small-scale creative communities, this study
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focuses on the largest content industry in the world: the video game
industry. It provides insights into the workings of intellectual property in a world driven by fairness, data, and popular culture. To do
so, it unpacks three extralegal norms of fairness that underlie content
creation in the gaming context: (1) norms of competitive integrity
prevalent among video game players; (2) norms of wealth sharing
arising out of communities of loyal consumers; and (3) labor-based
norms that allow gameplay streamers to claim ownership over their
recorded streams.
At bottom, this Article bears witness to the utility of fairness in
the overarching framework of copyright. Given the rise of fairnessdriven creativity, this analysis presents a cautionary tale militating
against strong IP protections. It shows that norms of fairness minimize the need for strong legal interventions in areas where fairness—rather than the law—drives creativity. And it suggests that
the labor theory is ill-fitted to inform or otherwise shape copyright
law, despite its pervasiveness in the gaming industry.

